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INTRODUCTION

Jared and Delilah—two high school students at James Island County
High—dated for months, claiming each other as “soul mates.” A new student, Perry, then arrived at school, and Delilah broke up with Jared to pursue
a relationship with Perry. After the breakup, Jared hated Delilah and thought
the worst of her. While working from home on his laptop, Jared posted
comments to his Facebook page, stating that Delilah was a lying, cheating
whore who was HIV positive. Other derogatory comments followed.
Classmates shared Jared’s post. Many of the school’s students and some of
the school’s personnel read the comments while at home. A national news
reporter related to one of the school’s teachers saw the post, picked up the
story, and began publishing a series of articles on teen cyberbullying. The
school was in an uproar. Students sided with either Jared or Delilah. No one
stayed neutral. Delilah and her parents went to school to complain to the
principal. They alleged that Jared’s behavior constituted harassment of Delilah because of her sex. Delilah and her parents insisted that the school punish Jared.
While the above is a hypothetical, it is a scenario that schools and
school administrations are facing across the country. This is speech that
takes place off-campus and after school hours yet it impacts the school. Can
the principal address the issue and punish Jared for this speech? Should the
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principal tell Delilah and her parents that their options are limited to suing
Jared for libel? Can the school lose its funding from the Department of Education for failing to enforce anti-harassment policies? Is there liability to
which the school will be subjected at the state level for failing to adequately
address cyberbullying? These are conflicts that American school personnel
now face on a frequent basis. How do school officials handle and resolve the
conflicting rights of students, their parents, and teachers regarding free
speech with the right to be let alone and be free from bullying and cyberbullying?
This article will examine whether public school officials can regulate
and punish off-campus student cyberspeech when this speech makes its way
onto the school’s campus. It will review recent federal district and circuit
court decisions from the past decade that interpret and apply the Supreme
Court of the United States’ student speech analysis.1 It will examine the interaction of this analysis with the First Amendment,2 the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights’ laws and the Department of Education’s
interpretation of harassment that applies to schools,3 and state legislatures’
attempts to limit and cope with cyberbullying in the public school setting.4
While bullying has been an issue with which schools and students have
coped for decades, if not centuries, cyberbullying is a recent phenomenon.5
How is cyberbullying defined,6 and how does it differ from bullying?
* Lisa Smith-Butler is the Associate Dean for Information Resources and Associate
Professor of Law at the Charleston School of Law where she teaches Children and the Law.
She would like to thank her research assistants, Brianna Hewitt, Annie Andrews, and Cassandra Hutchens for their research assistance with this article and her assistant, Carrie Cranford.
She would also like to thank colleagues, present and former, as well as the librarians at the
Charleston School of Law, for reviewing the article and offering suggestions.
1. See discussion infra Part II.B–C.
2. See discussion infra Part II.
3. See discussion infra Part III. The Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights
enforces civil rights laws for programs that receive federal funding from the Department of
Education. OCR: Know Your Rights, ED.GOV, http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/
ocr/know.html (last modified April 5, 2012). Because of this, the Department of Education
interacts frequently with school administrators for elementary and secondary schools, vocational schools, colleges and universities, proprietary schools, state education agencies, libraries, and museums. See 20 U.S.C. § 3413 (2006); see also OCR: Know Your Rights, supra.
The Office of Civil Rights enforces the statutes prohibiting discrimination “on the basis of
race, color, and national origin, sex, [and] disability.” OCR: Know Your Rights, supra; see
also 20 U.S.C. § 1681; 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131, 2000d.
4. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
5. See Robin M. Kowalski, Teasing and Bullying, in THE DARK SIDE OF INTERPERSONAL
COMMUNICATION 169, 169 (Brian H. Spitzberg & William R. Cupach eds., 2d ed. 2007); R.
CHACE RAMEY, STUDENT FIRST AMENDMENT SPEECH AND EXPRESSION RIGHTS: ARMBANDS TO
BONG HITS 139 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 2011).
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Several decisions from lower courts provide examples that demonstrate
courts’ definitions of cyberbullying. In the last few years, the United States
Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits heard
arguments and then published decisions involving off-campus student cyberspeech.7 A review of each decision provides examples of what the courts
and legislatures consider to constitute cyberbullying or threats. While the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second and Third Circuits have handed down two decisions each on the topic,8 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth and Eighth Circuits each issued only one opinion.9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered
two cases involving off-campus student cyberspeech.10 Both decisions involved speech that was critical of school officials.11 In one case, a middle
school student created an instant message icon on his home computer that
showed a “pistol firing a bullet at a person’s head, above which were dots
representing spattered blood. Beneath the drawing appeared the words ‘Kill
Mr. VanderMolen.’”12 Four years later, the court confronted a similar case in
which a student disagreed with a school’s decision to refuse to allow students
to use a certain facility on a particular date for Jamfest.13 The school gave
the students the option to hold Jamfest in another location or reschedule the
6. The Oxford English Dictionary defines cyberbully as “cyberbully, n[oun], (a) an
experienced user of computers who intimidates new users (nonce-use); (b) a person who engages in cyberbullying.” Cyber-bully, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/
Entry/250879?redirectedFrom=cyber-bully#eid212385813 (subscription required) (last visited
Nov. 10, 2012) (copy on file with Nova Law Review). “The anonymity afforded by cyberbullying suggests that cyberbullies are, in all likelihood, not the same individuals as the schoolyard bullies.” Kowalski, supra note 5, at 190.
7. See Doninger v. Niehoff (Doninger II), 642 F.3d 334, 340, 358 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 499 (2011); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 35, 40 (2d Cir. 2007); Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. (Layshock II), 593 F.3d 249, 263 (3d Cir.),
vacated en banc, reh’g granted en banc, No. 07-4465, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir.
Apr. 9, 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S.
Ct. 1097 (2012); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. (J.S. ex rel. Snyder II), 593
F.3d 286, 295, 308 (3d Cir.), vacated en banc, reh’g granted en banc, No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S.
App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Kowalski v.
Berkeley Cnty. Sch. (Kowalski I), 652 F.3d 565, 567, 577 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 1095 (2012); D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 756,
767 (8th Cir. 2011).
8. See Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 344; J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d at 307–08; Layshock
II, 593 F.3d at 263; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39–40.
9. D.J.M. ex rel. D.M., 647 F.3d at 764, 767; Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 574.
10. Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 344–48; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39–40.
11. Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 344–48; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39–40.
12. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36 (footnote omitted).
13. Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 339.
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event.14 Students objected.15 One student, Avery Doninger, created a blog at
home on her parents’ computer, urging students, their parents, and concerned
citizens to call the “douchebags” at the school office to complain.16 In both
of these decisions, the school’s punishment of the students’ speech was allowed to stand.17
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also dealt with
cases that involved the use of the internet to criticize school officials.18 The
court confronted two cases in its 2009 term.19 One case arose from the Middle District of Pennsylvania,20 while the other case came out of the Western
District of Pennsylvania.21 Both cases involved similar facts yet two different panels appeared to reach opposite results.22 In one case, a high school
senior created a parody profile of his high school principal while at home on
his MySpace account, referring to the principal as a “big steroid freak,” “big
whore,” and “big fag” along with other “big” insults.23 He then shared the
profile parody with other friends from school.24 While the court was sympathetic to the principal’s distress, it concluded that the school’s punishment
had violated the student’s free speech rights.25 On the same day, a different
panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also handed
down a decision, arising from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania, involving another high school parody of a school

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 334, 340–41.
17. Id. at 351, 358; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 40.
18. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d 286, 286, 290 (3d Cir.), vacated en banc,
reh’g granted en banc, No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
19. Id. at 286; Layshock II, 593 F.3d 249, 249, 251 (3d Cir.), vacated en banc, reh’g
granted en banc, No. 07-4465, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010), cert.
denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
20. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. (J.S. ex rel. Snyder I), No. 3:07cv585,
2008 WL 4279517, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en banc, 650 F.
3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
21. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. (Layshock I), 496 F. Supp. 2d
587, 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007) aff’d in part en banc, 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub
nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
22. Paul Easton, Comment, Splitting the Difference: Layshock and J.S. Chart a Separate
Path on Student Speech Rights, 53 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 17, 17 (2012),
http://bclawreview.org/files/2012/02/02_easton.pdf. Compare J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d
at 307–08, with Layshock II, 593 F.3d at 264.
23. Layshock II, 593 F.3d at 252–53.
24. Id. at 253.
25. Id. at 264.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol37/iss2/2

4

Smith-Butler: Walking the Regulatory Tightrope: Balancing Bullies' Free Speech

2013]

WALKING THE REGULATORY TIGHTROPE

247

principal.26 In this particular case, a student created an online profile of her
high school principal, describing his interests as: “detention. being a tight
ass. riding the fraintrain. spending time with my child (who looks like a
gorilla). baseball.my golden pen. [sic] fucking in my office. hitting on students and their parents.”27 This decision upheld the school’s punishment of
the student.28
While both the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and
Third Circuits heard cases involving student criticism of school officials, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit heard and published an
opinion in a case involving student-on-student internet speech.29 The decision arose in West Virginia and involved a female student who created a web
page that was allegedly about another classmate.30 The website labeled the
female student a “whore” and stated that “Shay [h]as [h]erpes.”31 The student, Kara Kowalski, was suspended and then she sued, alleging a violation
of her free speech.32 The court concluded that the school did not violate her
free speech rights when it punished her.33
Lastly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed, de novo, a decision for summary judgment from the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri in D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v.
Hannibal Public School District No. 60.34 D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. differs from
the Snyder v. Phelps,35 Kowalski v. Berkeley County School (Kowalski I),36
Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School District (Layshock III),37
Doninger v. Niehoff (Doninger II),38 and Wisniewski v. Board of Education39
26. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d at 286, 290–91; J.S. ex rel. Snyder I, No.
3:07cv585, 2008 WL 4279517, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en
banc, 650 F. 3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
27. J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d at 291 (footnote omitted).
28. Id. at 307–08.
29. Kowalski I, 652 F.3d 565, 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1095
(2012); see also Doninger II, 642 F.3d 334, 334, 339–40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499
(2011); J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d at 286, 291; Layshock II, 593 F.3d at 249, 252;
Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 34–36 (2d Cir. 2007).
30. Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 567.
31. Id. at 568.
32. Id. at 567, 569–70.
33. Id. at 577.
34. 647 F.3d 754–55, 757 (8th Cir. 2011).
35. 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
36. 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012).
37. 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch.
Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
38. 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011).
39. 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007).
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decisions, because D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. involved threats against other students, made by D.J.M. to another classmate, via his home computer.40 A
concerned classmate shared the threatening emails, which included threats to
“get[] a gun and shoot[] other students,” with the principal who then contacted the police.41 After D.J.M. was released from juvenile detention, he
was suspended for ten days by the school; shortly thereafter, he was suspended for the remainder of the semester.42 D.J.M. and his parents then sued
the school, arguing that his First Amendment speech rights had been violated
as he contended that his threats did not constitute “true threats.”43 The
Eighth Circuit upheld the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Missouri’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Hannibal School
District.44
All of the above cases describe factual backgrounds from circuit court
decisions that involved off-campus student cyberspeech, which ultimately
found its way on campus.45 Students used their home computers, working on
their own time rather than school time, to create web pages that were aimed
at officials or classmates to protest or complain about school-related personnel, classmates, or events.46 Although these web pages were created offcampus without school equipment, the schools punished—typically either
with suspension or expulsion—the speech and the students.47 These punishments were then appealed by parents, arguing such school conduct violated
the students’ First Amendment rights.48
This type of speech has existed for years in school settings.49 Principals
disciplined.50 Students grumbled.51 Students insulted each other. Because
the speech was not easily or readily publicized, it went unnoticed and was

40. Compare D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 756–
57 (8th Cir. 2011), with Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1213, Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 567, Layshock III,
650 F.3d at 207–08, Doninger II, 642 F.2d at 339, and Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 35–36.
41. D.J.M. ex rel. D.M., 647 F.3d at 756.
42. Id. at 757.
43. Id. at 759–60; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
44. D.J.M. ex rel. D.M., 647 F.3d at 767.
45. See Martha McCarthy, Student Electronic Expression: Unanswered Questions Persist, 277 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 4–9 (2012).
46. Id.
47. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 35–37 (2d Cir. 2007); McCarthy, supra
note 45, at 4–8.
48. See McCarthy, supra note 45, at 5–8.
49. See RAMEY, supra note 5, at 1.
50. Id.
51. See id.
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ignored.52 The internet, or cyberspace, changed this.53 Principals and school
personnel were mocked and insulted online.54 Student rivalries and bullying
moved off the playground and online.55 What once took weeks, months, and
sometimes years to travel through a community now buzzed through it in
hours, if not minutes.56 What was once only local news, now often goes viral, becoming national news in just hours.57
If such behavior was ignored in the past, why are school authorities now
eager to regulate this type of student speech? Are schools seeking to expand
their authority and power over students? Or, are schools trying to reign in
students and sort out threats, cope with the effects of student-on-student cyberbullying, and teach students civil discourse in addition to teaching the
standard curriculum while also coping with the impact of No Child Left Behind? What happened?
April 20, 199958 altered the public school landscape as thoroughly as
September 11, 200159 changed air travel. On April 20th, Eric Harris and
Dylan Klebold opened fire at 11:19 a.m. at Columbine High School in Columbine, Colorado.60 Their massacre lasted forty-nine minutes. 61 They killed
thirteen people and wounded twenty-four.62 Their rampage ended at 12:08
p.m. when they committed suicide,63 bringing the total number killed in the

52. See VICTORIA STUART-CASSEL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ANALYSIS OF STATE
BULLYING
LAWS
AND
POLICIES
1
(2011),
available
at
http://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/bullying/state-bullying-laws/state-bullying-laws.pdf; Kowalski, supra note 5, at 185.
53. See RAMEY, supra note 5, at 139.
54. Id. at 139, 141.
55. See id. at 141–42; Jocelyn Ho, Note, Bullied to Death: Cyberbullying and Student
Online Speech Rights, 64 FLA. L. REV. 789, 791 (2012).
56. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2007); see DANIEL J. SOLOVE,
THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 11 (2007).
57. For an example of local news rapidly becoming national news, consider the story of
Karen Klein. Online Campaign Winds Down for Bullied NY Woman, AP: THE BIG STORY,
July 20, 2012, 3:13 PM, http://www.bigstory.ap.org/article/online-campaign-winds-downbullied-ny-woman. In June of 2012, Karen Klein, a bus monitor employed by the public
school system in Greece, New York, was recorded being bullied by students on the bus. Id.
The video was posted online and “show[ed] Klein enduring profanity, insults, and threats from
middle school students on a school bus.” Id.
58. See DAVE CULLEN, COLUMBINE 4–5 (2009) [hereinafter CULLEN, COLUMBINE].
59. See Garrick Blalock et al., The Impact of Post-9/11 Airport Security Measures on the
Demand for Air Travel, 50 J.L. & ECON. 731, 731,733 (2007).
60. CULLEN, COLUMBINE, supra note 58, at 4–7, 35, 46.
61. Id. at 83.
62. Id. at 4–5.
63. Id. at 83.
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Columbine Massacre to fifteen.64 An investigation revealed hate-filled web
sites created by the student killers, journal entries containing threats and
plans, and other bizarre behaviors.65 While some of these items came to the
attention of law enforcement before the massacre, none of it was taken seriously until after the massacre.66 Recrimination, blame, lawsuits, new school
policies, and zero tolerance resulted.67 When asked for an explanation for
Harris’s and Klebold’s behavior, some said they had been bullied.68
Besides school violence and school shootings,69 cyberbullying and cyberharassment have become well-publicized problems that public schools are
encountering.70 In Massachusetts, in January of 2010, high school freshman,
Phoebe Prince, committed suicide after enduring on-campus bullying and
cyberbullying that her parents allege the school’s administration knew about,
but did nothing to stop.71 What cyberbullying was used? Besides in-school
taunts and insults, students also posted on Prince’s Facebook page, calling
her a “slut” and “whore.”72 Three of the six students charged with the criminal harassment, i.e., bullying, of Prince were placed on probation in May of
201173 while the town of South Hadley settled its suit by Prince’s parents for

64. See id. at 5, 83–84.
65. CULLEN, COLUMBINE, supra note 58, at 35, 183–84.
66. Id. at 84–85, 165–66, 220.
67. David L. Hudson, Jr., Censorship of Student Internet Speech: The Effect of Diminishing Student Rights, Fear of the Internet and Columbine, 2000 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DETROIT
C.L. 199, 209–10 (2000).
68. CULLEN, COLUMBINE, supra note 58, at 157–58, 339.
69. Since April 20, 1999, there have been more than thirty public school shootings in the
United States. Time Line of Worldwide School and Mass Shootings, INFOPLEASE,
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0777958.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).
70. Kathleen Conn, Allegations of School District Liability for Bullying, Cyberbullying,
and Teen Suicides After Sexting: Are New Legal Standards Emerging in the Courts?, 37 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 227, 240–41 (2011).
71. Kevin Cullen, A Mother’s Farewell, Forbidding Vengeance: Phoebe Prince, Her
Daughter, Lost, She Shares a Shattered Heart, BOS. GLOBE, May 15, 2011, at A1.
72. U.S. Teenagers Charged over Suicide of Irish ‘New Girl’ Targeted in ‘Relentless’
School Bullying Campaign, MAIL ONLINE (Mar. 31, 2010, 12:03 AM), http://www. dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1262487/phoebe-prince-9-us-teenagers-charged-suicide-death-irishnew-girl.html.
73. Erik Eckholm, 3 Ex-Students Get Probation in Bullying Linked to a Suicide, N.Y.
TIMES, May 5, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/06/us/06bully.html.
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$225,000.74 Since Prince’s death, there have been several high profile cyberbullying cases involving student suicides.75
With school violence and cyberbullying increasing,76 schools, school
boards, state legislatures, and the Department of Education are attempting to
create solutions to deal with the rise of bullying, cyberbullying, and cyberharassment. According to the National School Board Association, fortyeight states as of April 201277 have enacted some form of legislation78 that
concerns bullying, cyberbullying, or harassment by students in the public
school setting.79 The Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights
drafted and published a Dear Colleague Letter (DCL) on October 26, 2010,

74. O’Ryan Johnson, Town Paid $225G to Avoid Phoebe Prince Suit: ACLU Forces
South Hadley to Disclose Sum, BOS. HERALD, Dec. 28, 2011, http://bostonherald.com
/news/regional/view/2011_1228town_paid_225g_to_avoid_prince_suit_aclu_forces_south_ha
dley_to_disclose_sum.
75. Ho, supra note 55, at 789. For further commentary, as well as discussion of specific
cases of “bullycide,” see Ari Ezra Waldman, Tormented: Antigay Bullying in Schools, 84
TEMP. L. REV. 385, 392–94 (2012).
76. Ho, supra note 55, at 789.
77. See NAT’L SCH. BDS. ASS’N, STATE ANTI-BULLYING STATUTES APRIL 2012 (2012),
http://www.nsba.org/SchoolLaw/Issues/Safety/Table.pdf.
78. ALA. CODE §§ 16-28B-1 to -9 (2012); ALASKA STAT. §§ 14.33.200–.250 (2012);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341 (2012) (West); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514 (2012); CAL.
EDUC. CODE §§ 32261, 48900, 48900.4 (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 22-93-101 to -106
(2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-222d (2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4112D (2012) (LexisNexis); FLA. STAT. § 1006.147 (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.4 (2012); HAW. CODE R.
§§ 8-19-2, -6 (LexisNexis 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-917A (2012); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/10-22.6, 5/27-23.7 (2012); IND. CODE §§ 20-26-5-33, 20-33-8-0.2, 20-33-8-13.5 (2012);
IOWA CODE § 280.28 (2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-8256 (2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
525.070, .080 (LexisNexis 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:40.7, 17:416.1 (2012); ME. REV.
STAT. tit. 20-A, § 1001 (2012); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. §§ 7-424, 7-424.1 (LexisNexis 2012);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 37O (2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1310b (2012); MINN. STAT.
§§ 120B.232, 121A.0695 (2012); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 37-11-20, -67 (2012); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 160.775 (2012); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 79-267, 79-2,137 (2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
193-F:1 to :6 (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:37-14, -15 to -15.3, -16, -17 (West 2012); N.Y.
EDUC. LAW §§ 801-a, 2801 (McKinney 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-407.15–.18 (2012);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-19-17-22 (2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.666 (LexisNexis
2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, §§ 24-100.2–.5 (2012); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 339.351, .353, .356,
.359, .362, .364 (2012); 24 PA. STAT. ANN. §13-1303.1-A (West 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 1621-34 (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-63-110 to -150 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-6-1014
to -1019 (2012); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 25.0342, 28.002, 37.001, 37.083 (West 2012);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-11a-102, -201, -202, -301, -302, -401, -402 (LexisNexis 2012); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 22.1-208.01, -279.6 (2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 11, 570, 570c (2012);
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28A.300.285, 28A.600.480 (2012); W. VA. CODE §§ 18-2C-2 to -3
(2012); WIS. STAT. § 118.46 (2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4-311 to -315 (2012).
79. NAT’L SCH. BDS. ASS’N, supra note 77.
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concerning the same issue.80 The problem has become so pervasive and persistent that the American Jewish Committee and the Religious Freedom Education Project jointly published Harassment, Bullying, and Free Expression:
Guidelines for Free and Safe Public Schools.81
Students, disciplined under these school policies, are suing, arguing that
their schools have violated their First Amendment rights by imposing discipline for what amounts to off-campus cyberspeech, which is protected by the
First Amendment.82 Constitutional law scholar and dean, Erwin Chemerinsky,83 argues in an essay that this is all part of the “deconstitutionalization of
education” by the Supreme Court.84 Chemerinsky concludes that the “Supreme Court’s overall approach has been to withdraw the courts from involvement in American schools.”85 He examines the Court’s decisions in the
areas of desegregation, school funding, and freedom of speech.86 Chemerinsky argues that “[u]nder current First Amendment law, the most basic principle is that the government generally cannot restrict speech based on content
unless strict scrutiny is met.”87 Applying these principles to speech in the
public university setting, Chemerinsky says “[a] public university simply
cannot prohibit the expression of hate, including anti-Semitism, without running afoul of this principle. Punishing speech because of its hateful message
is inherently a content-based restriction on speech and would violate the First
Amendment.”88
How are public schools handling student cyberspeech that can also be
categorized as cyberbullying or cyberharassment? Courts are relying on the
80. See Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, to Colleague 1–2
(Oct. 26, 2010), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague201010.html [hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter].
81. AM. JEWISH COMM. & RELIGIOUS FREEDOM EDUC. PROJECT, HARASSMENT, BULLYING,
AND FREE EXPRESSION: GUIDELINES FOR FREE AND SAFE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 1, 5 (2012), available
at
http://www.nsba.org/schoollaw/issues/equity/harassment-bullying-and-freeexpression-guidelines-for-free-and-safe-public-schools.pdf.
82. Susan S. Bendlin, Far from the Classroom, the Cafeteria, and the Playing Field:
Why Should the School’s Disciplinary Arm Reach Speech Made in a Student’s Bedroom?, 48
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 195, 195–96 (2011).
83. Erwin Chemerinsky, Unpleasant Speech on Campus, Even Hate Speech, Is a First
Amendment Issue, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 765 n.* (2009) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, Unpleasant Speech] (introducing Chemerinsky as “Dean and Distinguished Professor of
Law, University of California, Irvine, School of Law”).
84. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
111, 112 (2004).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 113, 119, 124.
87. Chemerinsky, Unpleasant Speech, supra note 83, at 770.
88. Id.
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1969 Supreme Court decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District89 to regulate student cyberspeech in the public school
setting.90 Despite utilizing the Tinker test, both federal district and circuit
courts have reached a variety of different conclusions.91 Are the courts misapplying or misunderstanding Tinker? Are the facts of each case determinative of the outcome? Are these decisions reconcilable or is there a circuit
split?
This article will examine the existing speech cases from federal district
and circuit courts in light of the Morse quartet, a series of Supreme Court
decisions on student speech rights.92 Part II will review the holdings of these
decisions and explore their interaction with the First Amendment.93 Part III
will review the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights definition
of harassment while Part IV will examine state cyberbullying legislation.94
Part V will analyze and review the interplay of the United States Constitution, Supreme Court decisions, state legislation, the Department of Education’s laws and interpretations thereof, and school policies with these cases,
attempting to ascertain the appropriate analysis for student cyberspeech cas-

89. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
90. E.g., Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
91. A selected list of federal district court cases involving regulation of off-campus student speech includes: T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d
767, 771, 784 (N.D. Ind. 2011); J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F.
Supp. 2d 1094, 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Evans, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1367; Mardis v. Hannibal
Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1115–16 (E.D. Mo. 2010); Requa v. Kent Sch.
Dist. No. 415, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1274, 1276 (W.D. Wash. 2007); Flaherty v. Keystone
Oaks Sch. Dist., 247 F. Supp. 2d 698, 700 (W.D. Pa. 2003); Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v.
Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 781 (E.D. Mich. 2002); Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F.
Supp. 2d 791, 795–96 (N.D. Ohio 2002). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania also dealt with
the issue in J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 850 (Pa. 2002). For
circuit court decisions on the topic, see D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No.
60, 647 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 2011); Kowalski I, 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012); Layshock III, 650 F.3d 205, 207, 210 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc),
cert. denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012);
J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. (J.S. ex rel. Snyder III), 650 F.3d 915, 920 (3d
Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Doninger II, 642 F.3d 334, 342 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 37 (2d
Cir. 2007).
92. See Melinda Cupps Dickler, The Morse Quartet: Student Speech and the First
Amendment, 53 LOY. L. REV. 355, 380–84 (2007); see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393,
410 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist.
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
93. See discussion infra Part II.
94. See discussion infra Parts III–IV.
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es.95 Part VI will conclude that there is a circuit split that requires the intervention of the Supreme Court to be resolved.96
II.
A.

FIRST AMENDMENT: STUDENT CYBERSPEECH

First Amendment: What Does It Mean?

“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.”97
Protecting speech was so important that it was enshrined in the First
Amendment of the Bill of Rights.98 The Supreme Court has issued numerous
opinions discussing this amendment.99 As the Court recently stated in Snyder v. Phelps,100 “[t]he First Amendment reflects ‘a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open.’”101 Why? Quoting Garrison v. Louisiana,102 the
Court noted that free speech “‘is more than self-expression; it is the essence
of self-government,’”103 while acknowledging that “‘speech on public issues
occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is
entitled to special protection.’”104
How is Snyder applicable to the student cyberspeech cases? Besides
providing the most recent Supreme Court First Amendment analysis, Snyder,
like the school cyberspeech decisions, deals with speech that can be described as unkind or cruel.105 The Snyder Court upheld Westboro Baptist’s
right to picket outside an area near veterans’ funerals with signs that read
“‘God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,’” “‘Fag Troops,’” “‘Thank God
for Dead Soldiers,’” and “‘God Hates You.’”106 The Court’s majority opinion concluded:
95. See discussion infra Part V.
96. See discussion infra Part VI.
97. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
98. Michael Kent Curtis, Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life After Death: The
Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the United States, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1071, 1108 (2000).
99. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011).
100. 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
101. Id. at 1215 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
102. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
103. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215 (quoting Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74–75).
104. Id. at 1215 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)).
105. See id. at 1216–17, 1220.
106. Id. at 1216–17.
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Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to
tears of both joy and sorrow, and⎯as it did here—inflict great
pain. On the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a different
course—to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure
that we do not stifle public debate. That choice requires that we
shield Westboro . . . .107

How do we apply these principles in the public school setting? Do students and teachers have free speech? What happens in public schools grades
K–12 when teachers or principals punish students for speech made or directed at personnel or the students of the school? Is this speech protected?
Can schools punish these student speakers even if the speakers “inflict great
pain?”108
B.

Morse Quartet

The Supreme Court answered the question about students’ speech rights
in the public school setting in its 1969 decision in Tinker.109 The Court further delineated its student speech analysis with three later opinions.110
Grouped together, these four opinions are sometimes referred to as the
“Morse quartet.”111
Tinker was the first decision of the quartet.112 It involved the now infamous, non-disruptive, black armband worn by Mary Beth Tinker to her
school to protest the Vietnam War.113 Mary Beth was suspended from school
until she agreed to no longer wear the armband to school.114 Her parents
sued on her behalf, arguing the school’s actions violated Mary Beth’s First
Amendment free speech rights.115 The Tinker Court agreed with Mary Beth,
stating “[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate.”116 Tinker established the analysis for the punishment of student speech
as follows:
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
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See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
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See id. at 362.
Id. at 356.
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
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A student’s rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom
hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on
the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if
he does so without “materially and substantially interfer[ing] with
the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school” and without colliding with the rights of others. But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason⎯whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior—
materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.117

Between 1986 and 2007, the Court decided three more student speech
cases, which limited the holding of Tinker.118 Bethel School District No. 403
v. Fraser119 allowed schools to punish lewd and offensive speech given at a
high school assembly to a captive audience,120 while Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier121 permitted schools to exercise editorial control over
speech for pedagogical purposes, which carried the imprimatur of the
school.122 Morse v. Frederick123 allowed the punishment of student speech
occurring at a school-sanctioned off-campus event that appeared to advocate
the use of illegal drugs.124
In 1983, Matthew Fraser was suspended for three days and had his
name removed from the list of potential graduation speakers because of a
candidate speech he delivered to a high school assembly.125 In the speech,
Fraser used a sexual innuendo to refer to one of the candidates running for
school office.126 The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
both applying Tinker, held that the school violated Fraser’s First Amendment

117. Id. at 512–13 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
118. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986); see
also Dickler, supra note 92, at 356.
119. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
120. Id. at 685.
121. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
122. Id. at 273.
123. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
124. Id. at 397, 410.
125. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677–78.
126. Id.
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rights.127 The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion authored by then Chief
Justice Burger, reversed, framing the issue as “whether the First Amendment
prevents a school district from disciplining a high school student for giving a
lewd speech at a school assembly.”128 Concluding such discipline was allowed, the Court stated:
The First Amendment guarantees wide freedom in matters of adult
public discourse. . . . It does not follow, however, that simply because the use of an offensive form of expression may not be prohibited to adults making what the speaker considers a political
point, the same latitude must be permitted to children in a public
school. . . . [T]he constitutional rights of students in public school
are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings. As cogently expressed by Judge Newman, “the First
Amendment gives a high school student the classroom right to
wear Tinker’s armband, but not Cohen’s jacket.”129

Fraser was followed two years later by Kuhlmeier, which involved
school censorship of a student-edited school newspaper.130 The Court framed
the issue as “the extent to which educators may exercise editorial control
over the contents of a high school newspaper produced as part of the school’s
journalism curriculum.”131 The high school principal deleted two articles
from the newspaper before it went to print.132 The paper’s student editors
sued, alleging this censorship violated their First Amendment rights.133
Again, the Court further eroded the holding in Tinker.134 Writing for the majority, Justice White stated:
[W]e hold that educators do not offend the First Amendment by
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.
This standard is consistent with our oft-expressed view that the
127. Id. at 679; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I; Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512–13 (1969).
128. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677, 680; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
129. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682–83 (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057
(2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
130. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262 (1988); Fraser, 478 U.S. at
675.
131. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 262.
132. Id. at 263–64.
133. Id. at 264; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
134. See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 272–73 & n.5 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)).
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education of the Nation’s youth is primarily the responsibility of
parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of
federal judges.135

The Court last addressed student speech in 2007 with its decision in
Morse,136 completing the series of cases that are sometimes referred to as the
Morse quartet.137 Morse involved off-campus speech at a school-sponsored
activity.138 The Olympic Torch Relay was scheduled to pass “through Juneau, Alaska, on its way to the winter games in Salt Lake City, Utah.”139 During the procession, the relay was scheduled to pass by Frederick’s high
school.140 To celebrate and participate, Deborah Morse, school principal,
allowed teachers and students to leave the school building and attend the
relay on the city streets as a school-sponsored activity.141 As the television
cameras rolled by, Joseph Frederick, a student, unfurled a fourteen-foot banner that proclaimed: “‘BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.’”142 Believing the banner to
be advocating the use of an illegal drug, marijuana, Morse demanded that
Frederick lower the banner.143 He refused so she confiscated the banner and
then suspended him for ten days.144 Frederick sued, alleging Morse’s behavior violated his First Amendment rights.145 He argued his banner was not
promoting illegal drug use but rather was simply nonsense, designed to catch
the television cameras’ attention.146 The Court framed the issue as “whether
a principal may, consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student speech
at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal
drug use. We hold that she may.”147 The Court then further explained its
analysis and holding in Fraser, saying:

135. Id. at 262, 273 (footnote omitted) (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley ex rel. Rowley, 458
U.S. 176, 208 (1982); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975), abrogated on other
grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,
104 (1968)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
136. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396–97 (2007).
137. See Dickler, supra note 92, at 380.
138. Morse, 551 U.S. at 396–99.
139. Id. at 397.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Morse, 551 U.S. at 398.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 399; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
146. Morse, 551 U.S. at 401 (quoting Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1117–18 (9th
Cir.), cert. granted, 549 U.S. 1075 (2006), and rev’d, 551 U.S. 393 (2007)).
147. Id. at 403; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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[I]t is enough to distill from Fraser two basic principles. First,
Fraser’s holding demonstrates that “the constitutional rights of
students in public school are not automatically coextensive with
the rights of adults in other settings.” Had Fraser delivered the
same speech in a public forum outside the school context, it would
have been protected. In school, however, Fraser’s First Amendment rights were circumscribed “in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.” Second, Fraser established that
the mode of analysis set forth in Tinker is not absolute. Whatever
approach Fraser employed, it certainly did not conduct the “substantial disruption” analysis proscribed by Tinker.
....
The case, [Kuhlmeier], is nevertheless instructive because it confirms both principles cited above. Kuhlmeier acknowledged that
schools may regulate some speech “even though the government
could not censor similar speech outside the school.” And, like
Fraser, it confirms that the rule of Tinker is not the only basis for
restricting student speech.148

None of the above decisions deal with off-campus student cyberspeech;
yet, these are the decisions that lower federal courts—both district and circuit—are relying upon to analyze whether school officials can punish offcampus student cyberspeech.149 As the discussion below indicates, lower
courts are applying the Morse quartet analysis with varying results.150
C.

Circuit Courts: Split or Reconcilable?

Between 2007 and 2011, the United States Courts of Appeals for the
Second, Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits published opinions that dealt with
off-campus student cyberspeech.151 Two decisions from the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit involved student speech
148. Morse, 551 U.S. at 404–06 (citations omitted); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
149. See discussion infra Part II.C–D.
150. See discussion infra Part II.C–D.
151. See D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 756 (8th
Cir. 2011); Kowalski I, 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1095
(2012); Layshock III, 650 F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Blue
Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650
F.3d 915, 920 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Doninger II, 642
F.3d 334, 340 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494
F.3d 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2007). Other circuit courts have yet to address the explicit issue of offcampus regulation of student cyberspeech.
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about school officials.152 The court upheld the school’s punishment of the
student speech in both cases.153 Meanwhile, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit published two decisions, issued by two different
panels, on February 4, 2010154 that appeared to reach different results with
seemingly similar facts.155 A decision from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, which punished a student for an internet profile parody of her high school principal, was upheld.156 However, a
decision from the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania agreed with a student that his First Amendment rights were
violated when he was punished for creating a profile parody of his principal
on MySpace.157 Because this appeared to many observers to reflect a split
within the Third Circuit, the court re-heard both cases while sitting en
banc.158 Ultimately, the students prevailed in both cases with the court holding that school officials had violated the students’ First Amendment rights.159
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit heard a
case that involved the school’s punishment of a student for offensive cyberspeech made against another student.160 The court upheld the school’s punishment of the student.161 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit upheld the decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri, agreeing with the court that D.J.M.’s instant messages

152. See Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 340; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36.
153. Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 357–58; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 40.
154. J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d 286, 286, 290–91 (3d Cir.), vacated en banc, reh’g
granted en banc, No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Layshock II, 593 F.3d 249, 249, 252–54 (3d Cir.), vacated en
banc, reh’g granted en banc, No. 07-4465, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9,
2010), cert. denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097
(2012); Easton, supra note 22, at 17.
155. See Easton, supra note 22, at 17.
156. J.S ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d at 307–08; J.S. ex rel. Snyder I, No. 3:07cv585, 2008
WL 4279517, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en banc, 650 F.3d
915 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
157. Layshock I, 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 587, 591, 606 (W.D. Pa. 2007), aff’d in part en
banc, 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex
rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
158. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d 915, 915, 920 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); see also Layshock III, 650 F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 2011) (en
banc), cert. denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097
(2012).
159. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 932, 933; see also Layshock III, 650 F.3d at
219.
160. Kowalski I, 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012).
161. Id. at 577.
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threatening to get a gun and shoot classmates did constitute “true threats”
that were not protected by the First Amendment.162
Because similar fact patterns appeared to be involved in the above cases, with differing results reached, Doninger II, J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, and
Kowalski I were appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, based
on the argument that a circuit split existed.163 Despite the differing results,
the Court denied certiorari for all three petitions, leaving the decisions to
stand.164 Is there a circuit split or can these cases be reconciled? This section
will examine and review the decisions.
The decisions from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit will be reviewed first. This court has decided two cases,
Wisniewski and Doninger II, on the subject.165 In both decisions, the court
upheld the school’s right to punish students for off-campus student cyberspeech that was ultimately aimed at school officials.166
In Wisniewski, a middle school student, Aaron Wisniewski, was suspended from school because of an instant message he sent classmates from
his parents’ home computer.167 The message included an instant message
icon with “a small drawing of a pistol firing a bullet at a person’s head,
above which were dots representing spattered blood. Beneath the drawing
appeared the words ‘Kill Mr. VanderMolen.’ Philip VanderMolen was Aaron’s English teacher at the time.”168 While Aaron did not send the instant
message icon or message to any school officials, he shared it with some of
his classmates.169 One of the classmates eventually shared the icon and message with Mr. VanderMolen who was reportedly distressed.170 Mr. VanderMolen then shared it with school authorities.171 The school shared it with
“the local police [department], the Superintendent . . . , and Aaron’s parents.”172 When confronted, Aaron admitted he had created the instant message and icon—though a police investigator determined that the icon was

162. D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 756, 757 n.1,
762 (8th Cir. 2011).
163. See discussion infra note 325.
164. See discussion infra note 325.
165. Doninger II, 642 F.3d 334, 338 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011);
Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2007).
166. Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 340, 358; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39–40.
167. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 35–36.
168. Id. at 36 (footnote omitted).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36.
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intended only as a joke.173 Once the severity of the issue was pointed out to
him, Aaron expressed regret.174 Mr. VanderMolen asked to stop teaching
Aaron, and this was allowed.175
In the meantime, the police department investigated and questioned Aaron.176 He was referred to a psychologist for testing.177 Based on the testing
and evaluation, the psychologist concluded the icon was intended as a joke,
and that Aaron had no violent intent and posed no actual threat.178 The police
investigation was concluded with no arrest being made, but there was a hearing before the school superintendent.179 At the hearing, the hearing officer
found that “[s]ubstantial and competent evidence exists that Aaron engaged
in the act of sending a threatening message to his buddies, the subject of
which was a teacher.”180 The hearing officer said: “He admitted it. . . . I
conclude Aaron did commit the act of threatening a teacher . . . creating an
environment threatening the health, safety, and welfare of others . . . .”181
Aaron was suspended for a semester.182
Aaron sued, arguing his icon “was protected speech under the First
Amendment.”183 The court upheld the school’s punishment of Aaron, concluding that the fact that his conduct occurred off-campus did “not necessarily insulate him from school discipline.”184 Instead, the court applied
Tinker’s “reasonably foreseeable risk” test to the facts and concluded that it
was foreseeable that school authorities would learn of Aaron’s pistol icon.185
It was then foreseeable that the threatening icon would “‘materially and substantially disrupt’” the school’s work.186
A year later, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
heard arguments in Doninger v. Niehoff (Doninger I),187 which also involved
student speech.188 In Doninger I, Avery Doninger was involved in a dispute
173. Id.
174. See id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 36–37.
182. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 37.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 39–40 (footnote omitted).
185. Id. at 38–39 (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007)).
186. Id. (quoting Morse, 551 U.S. at 403).
187. 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011).
188. See id. at 44–46.
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with school officials about the scheduling and location of a “battle of the
bands” known as “Jamfest.”189 Because of personnel issues, Doninger and
the Student Council were advised that Jamfest would either have to be rescheduled for another date or relocated to another facility if the Council was
determined to adhere to the named date.190 After learning of this, four members of the Student Council met in the computer lab and accessed a parent’s
email account.191 From this email account, the students sent out two mass
emails to students and parents—one of which included the contact information for Paula Schwartz, the district superintendent—advising them to contact the district office and forward the email to as many people as possible to
see that Jamfest was held as scheduled in the new auditorium.192 Unhappy
with the decision to cancel Jamfest, Avery Doninger then posted an entry on
her blog from her home that said:
jamfest is cancelled due to douchebags in central office. here is an
email that we sent to a ton of people and asked them to forward to
everyone in their address book to help get support for jamfest. basically, because we sent it out, Paula Schwartz is getting a TON of
phone calls and emails and such. we have so much support and we
really appriciate [sic] it. however, she got pissed off and decided
to just cancel the whole thing all together [sic].193

Because of the vulgar language of the blog and the manner in which
Avery expressed disagreement with the school’s administration, Niehoff
decided that Avery could not run for Senior Class Secretary because
“Avery’s conduct . . . failed to display the civility and good citizenship expected of class officers.”194 Avery’s mother sued, arguing Niehoff’s actions
violated her daughter’s First Amendment rights.195
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit analyzed
Doninger’s First Amendment claims, it began with Tinker, noting that “students do not ‘shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.’”196 Yet while Tinker protected students’

189. Id. at 44.
190. Doninger II, 642 F.3d 334, 339 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 339–40.
193. Id. at 340–41 (second alteration in original).
194. Doninger I, 527 F.3d at 46.
195. Id. at 46–47.
196. Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 344 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
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speech rights,197 the court concluded that these rights, in the public school
setting, were not equal to the free speech rights of adults.198 In fact, the court
analyzed and discussed the student speech holdings of the Supreme Court
and concluded that “school administrators [could] prohibit student expression” when certain circumstances were met.199 Utilizing the “foreseeable
disruption test” articulated by Tinker, the Doninger I court stated:
The Supreme Court has yet to speak on the scope of a school’s
authority to regulate expression that, like Avery’s, does not occur
on school grounds or at a school sponsored event. We have determined, however, that a student may be disciplined for expressive conduct, even conduct occurring off school grounds, when
this conduct “would foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within the school environment,” at least when it was similarly
foreseeable that the off-campus expression might also reach campus.200

Meanwhile, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
handed down, via two panels, two decisions on school speech cases on February 4, 2010.201 In two cases, involving seemingly similar facts, the two
panels reached what appeared to be different results.202 Consequently, the
Third Circuit sat, en banc, to rehear both cases.203

197. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
198. Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 344 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675, 682 (1986)).
199. Id. at 344 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513).
200. Doninger I, 527 F.3d at 48 (quoting Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d
Cir. 2007)).
201. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d 286, 286, 307–08 (3d Cir.), vacated en banc,
reh’g granted en banc, No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Layshock II, 593 F.3d 249, 249 (3d Cir.), vacated en banc,
reh’g granted en banc, No. 07-4465, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010), cert.
denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
202. Easton, supra note 22, at 18; see also Shannon P. Duffy, Do 3rd Circuit Rulings over
Student Speech on MySpace Pages Contradict?, LAW.COM (Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.
law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1202442025383.
203. Layshock III, 650 F.3d 205, 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Blue
Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). The Court vacated both
earlier panel opinions. Id. at 207; J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d 915, 920 (3d Cir. 2011) (en
banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). Shortly after this decision was issued, Daniel J.
Solove addressed the issue in a blog post. See Daniel J. Solove, School Discipline for OffCampus Speech and the First Amendment, HUFFPOST EDUC. (June 20, 2011, 11:43 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-j-solove/school-discipline-free-speech_b_877203.html.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol37/iss2/2

22

Smith-Butler: Walking the Regulatory Tightrope: Balancing Bullies' Free Speech

2013]

WALKING THE REGULATORY TIGHTROPE

265

In Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School District (Layshock
II),204 the initial panel comprising Judges McKee, Smith, and Roth,205 framed
the issue before the court as whether “a school district can punish a student
for expressive conduct that originated outside of the classroom, when that
conduct did not disturb the school environment and was not related to any
school sponsored event.”206 “Justin Layshock, . . . a . . . senior at Hickory
High School . . . in Hermitage, Pennsylvania,” posted a “‘parody profile’ of
his [high school] principal, Eric Trosch,” on his MySpace account while at
his grandmother’s using her computer.207 While Justin copied and pasted Mr.
Trosch’s photograph from the school’s web site, that is the extent to which a
school resource was used.208 Justin’s parody gave bogus “big” answers to
questions he pretended Mr. Trosch answered.209 Justin’s parody stated:
Birthday: too drunk to remember
Are you a health freak: big steroid freak
In the past month have you smoked: big blunt
In the past month have you been on pills: big pills
In the past month have you gone Skinny Dipping: big lake, not
big dick
In the past month have you Stolen Anything: big keg
Ever been drunk: big number of times
Ever been called a Tease: big whore
Ever been Beaten up: big fag
Ever Shoplifted: big bag of kmart
Number of Drugs I have taken: big210

Justin shared the profile with his friends at school who then shared the
profile with many other students.211 Mr. Trosch learned about the profile
after three other students posted similar profiles, and Mr. Trosch’s eleventh
grade daughter showed one of them to her father.212 The court noted that the
profile spread through the school like “wildfire” and that students accessed

204. 593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir.), vacated en banc, reh’g granted en banc, No. 07-4465, 2010
U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist.
v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
205. Id. at 251.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 252.
208. Id.
209. Layshock II, 593 F.3d at 252.
210. Id. at 252–53.
211. Id. at 253.
212. Id.
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the profile at school.213 Mr. Trosch explained he found the profile “‘degrading,’ ‘demeaning,’ ‘demoralizing,’ and ‘shocking.’”214 After an investigation, the school district suspended Justin for ten days, placed him in the Alternative Education Program for his last semester of high school, banned him
from all extracurricular activities, and refused to allow him to participate in
his graduation ceremony.215 The school district concluded that Justin had
violated Hermitage School District’s Discipline Code, finding “[d]isruption
of the normal school process; [d]isrespect; [h]arassment of a school administrator via computer/internet with remarks that have demeaning implications;
[g]ross misbehavior; [o]bscene, vulgar, and profane language; [c]omputer
[p]olicy violations (use of school pictures without authorization).”216
Justin and his parents sued, arguing that the Hermitage School District
had violated his First Amendment rights.217 The United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania agreed with Justin, granting him
summary judgment.218 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit panel published their opinion on February 4, 2010, and affirmed the
decision of the lower court, holding “schools may punish expressive conduct
that occurs outside of school as if it occurred inside the ‘schoolhouse gate’
under certain very limited circumstances, none of which are present here.”219
On the same day, February 4, 2010, another panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, comprising of Circuit Judges Fisher
and Chagares and District Judge Diamond,220 published their opinion in J.S.
ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District (J.S. ex rel. Snyder II).221 In
J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, J.S., an eighth grader, created a MySpace profile parody of her high school principle, Mr. McGonigle, with another friend, K.L.,
from their home computers.222 As with Layshock II, J.S. and K.L. copied a
picture of Mr. McGonigle from the school’s web site and pasted it on their
213. Id.
214. Layshock II, 593 F.3d at 253.
215. Id. at 254.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 254–55.
218. Layshock I, 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 606 (W.D. Pa. 2007), aff’d in part en banc, 650
F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder,
132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
219. Layshock II, 593 F.3d at 249, 263.
220. J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d 286, 286, 290 (3d Cir.), vacated en banc, reh’g granted en banc, No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). Judge Diamond, of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, was sitting
on the panel by designation. Id. at 290 & n.*.
221. 593 F.3d 286, 290 (3d Cir.), vacated en banc, reh’g granted en banc, No. 08-4138,
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
222. Id. at 290–91.
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MySpace parody profile.223 While the profile did not identify McGonigle by
name or location, it included his school photograph and described him as
saying:
HELLO CHILDREN
yes. it’s your oh so wonderful, hairy, expressionless,
sex addict, fagass, put on this world with a small dick
PRINCIPAL
I have come to myspace so i can pervert the minds of other
principal’s [sic] to be just like me. I know, I know, you’re all
thrilled
Another reason I came to my space is because⎯I am
keeping an eye on you students
(who i care for so much)
For those who want to be my friend, and aren’t in my school
I love children, sex (any kind), dogs, long walks on the
beach, tv, being a dick head, and last but not least my
darling wife who looks like a man (who satisfies my needs)
MY FRAINTRAIN
so please, feel free to add me, message me whatever.224

J.S. and K.L. left the profile “public” on Sunday night.225 By Monday afternoon, students at Blue Mountain Middle School had seen the profile and
were discussing it, so J.S. made the profile “private” when she went home.226
223.
224.
225.
226.
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On Tuesday, a student at Blue Mountain approached McGonigle and told
him about the profile.227 After McGonigle viewed the profile, he contacted
the School Superintendant, Joyce Romberger, and the Director of Technology, Susan Schneider-Morgan.228 After meeting and reviewing the profile,
the three “concluded that it violated the School District’s Acceptable Use
Policy (AUP) because it violated copyright laws in misappropriating McGonigle’s photograph from the School District’s website without permission.”229
McGonigle then met with J.S. and K.L. and their mothers telling them
he was suspending them for ten days and also considering legal action.230
While students could not view the profile at school because MySpace was a
blocked site, McGonigle and other teachers testified that the profile parody
disrupted school—students chattered about the profile in class and related
disruptions in the hallways, requiring extra student supervision.231 After the
suspended students returned to school, they were greeted by fellow classmates who had decorated their lockers and offered them written congratulations for their behavior.232
J.S. and her parents sued, arguing the Blue Mountain School District
had violated her First Amendment rights.233 The United States District Court
for the Middle District Court of Pennsylvania decided in favor of the school,
holding that the school did not violate J.S.’s First Amendment rights when
disciplining her because of the on campus impact of her “lewd and vulgar”
speech.234 The Third Circuit’s panel affirmed the lower court’s decision.235
According to the court’s panel, Tinker’s foreseeable and material and substantial disruption test was the appropriate analysis to be applied to the
facts.236 Certainty regarding a disruption was not required; rather the court
indicated that the standard was the reasonable foreseeability of disruption
that schools had to anticipate and protect students from.237 Schools were
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d at 292.
230. Id. at 293.
231. Id. at 292, 294.
232. Id. at 294.
233. Id. at 294–95.
234. J.S. ex rel. Snyder I, No. 3:07cv585, 2008 WL 4279517, at *6–7 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11,
2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en banc, 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 1097 (2012).
235. J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d at 307–08. In this panel opinion, Judge Chagares
concurred in part with the decision and also dissented in part. Id. at 308 (Chagares, Cir. J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
236. See id. at 298 (majority opinion).
237. See id. at 298–99 (citing Doninger I, 527 F.3d 41, 51 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011); Lowery v. Euverard,
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required to engage in a balancing analysis, balancing three rights: The right
of students to be free from the invasion of their rights, the right of the students to avoid a “substantial disruption” at school, and the right of students
to engage in protected First Amendment speech off-campus which does impact on campus activities.238 Thus, the court appeared to believe that Tinker
required a balancing of the rights of others with the rights of an individual.239
As the court’s panel applied this analysis to the facts of the case, it concluded that a substantial disruption was not created on campus by J.S.’s profile of McGoingle.240 However, given the incendiary nature of the profile,
i.e. indirectly suggesting that McGoingle engaged in pedophilic behavior
with his students, the panel concluded that the school’s behavior did not violate J.S.’s First Amendment rights as McGoingle’s actions forestalled the
threat of future disruptions.241 This, the court indicated, satisfied the Tinker
test.242 The court refused to accept J.S.’s argument that off-campus speech
could not be regulated by school authorities.243 Instead, it acknowledged the
way that the evolving technology was blurring the boundaries between
school and home and stated ‘“[t]erritoriality is not necessarily a useful concept in determining the limit of [school administrators’] authority.”’244
Given the similar facts of both cases, and yet the dissimilar dispositions,245 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed to
hear the cases en banc and did so in June of 2010.246 A year later, in June of
2011, the court published both opinions.247
497 F.3d 584, 591–92, 596 (6th Cir. 2007); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989
(9th Cir. 2001)).
238. See id. (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007); Bethel Sch. Dist. No.
403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 688 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring); Saxe v. State Coll. Area
Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 216 n.11 (3d Cir. 2001)).
239. See id. at 299 (citing Morse, 551 U.S. at 405; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688 (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Saxe, 240 F.3d at 216 n.11); see also Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680–81; Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508–09 (1969).
240. J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d at 299.
241. See id. at 300–03.
242. See id. at 298, 300, 303; see also Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13.
243. J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d at 301.
244. Id. (quoting Doninger I, 527 F.3d 41, 48–49 (2d Cir. 2008) (alteration in original),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011)).
245. Compare id. at 290–94, 303, with Layshock II, 593 F.3d 249, 252–54, 264 (3d Cir.),
vacated en banc, reh’g granted en banc, No. 07-4465, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir.
Apr. 9, 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S.
Ct. 1097 (2012).
246. J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d 915, 915, 920 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Layshock III, 650 F.3d 205, 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied
sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
247. J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 915; Layshock III, 650 F.3d at 205.
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Layshock III affirmed and upheld the holding of the initial panel, published in February of 2010.248 The en banc court held that the school had
violated Justin Layshock’s First Amendment rights.249 After reviewing and
reconciling several cases cited by the school district, including Doninger I
and Wisniewski,250 the Layshock III en banc court concluded that school officials have very limited authority, according to the application of Tinker and
Fraser, to punish off-campus student speech.251 Quoting Thomas v. Board of
Education,252 the court stated that “‘[o]ur willingness to defer to the schoolmaster’s expertise in administering school discipline rests, in large measure,
upon the supposition that the arm of authority does not reach beyond the
schoolhouse gate.’”253 The court said that it was unnecessary to define the
parameters of school authorities regarding off-campus student speech since
Justin’s speech clearly did not substantially or materially disrupt the school’s
activities.254 Without a substantial disruption, Tinker was not applicable.255
The court concluded that while Fraser allowed school authorities to discipline student speech that was “lewd” or “vulgar,” this authority was limited
to on campus lewd or vulgar speech.256 Discussing the applicability of Fraser, the court stated “Fraser does not allow the School District to punish
Justin for expressive conduct [that] occurred outside of the school context.”257 This holding seems to be at odds with the court’s holding in J.S. ex
rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District (J.S. ex rel. Snyder III),258
which announced that territoriality was not the defining factor when deter-

248. Layshock III, 650 F.3d at 207.
249. Id. at 207, 219.
250. The Court distinguished the facts in Layshock III from Doninger I and Wisniewski as
well as other cases. Id.
251. Id. at 216, 219 (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404–05 (2007); Layshock I,
496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 599–600 (W.D. Pa. 2007), aff’d in part en banc, 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir.
2011), cert. denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097
(2012)).
252. 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979).
253. Layshock III, 650 F.3d at 219 (quoting Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1044–45).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 216; see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509
(1969).
256. Layshock III, 650 F.3d at 217 n.17 (citing Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240
F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir. 2001)); see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685
(1986).
257. Layshock III, 650 F.3d at 219 (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404–05
(2007)).
258. Compare id. at 218–19, with J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d 915, 936 (3d Cir. 2011)
(en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
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mining the reach of school authorities to regulate off-campus student
speech.259
In J.S. ex rel Snyder III, the en banc court remanded the decision to the
district court, reversing in part and affirming in part.260 While the court concluded that the school’s disciplinary policies were not facially unconstitutional, as J.S. and her parents alleged,261 it reversed the holding that the
school could punish J.S.’s speech.262 Noting that schools could suppress or
punish student speech in certain situations, the court stated “[t]he authority of
public school officials is not boundless.”263 The court then engaged in a discussion as to what the Supreme Court’s basic analysis was when reviewing
student speech punishment arguments, discussing Tinker’s “substantial disruption” requirement and noting the further exceptions created by Fraser,
Kuhlmeier, and Morse.264
An examination of the court’s analysis indicated that while the court
acknowledged that a school could suppress or punish student speech in the
public school setting, in order to prevail in court, “school officials must
[show] that ‘the forbidden [speech or] conduct would materially and substantially interfere with the . . . appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school.’”265
The court noted that schools cannot satisfy this burden if they cannot
demonstrate more than the “‘desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompan[ies] an unpopular viewpoint.’”266 When examining the implications and applications of Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse, the
court concluded that if Tinker was not applicable, then there was no need to
establish a substantial disruption and instead the Fraser, Kuhlmeier, or
Morse exceptions applied.267 The court said that Fraser allowed schools to
discipline school speech, categorized as lewd or vulgar, when a captive audi259. J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 940 (Smith, Cir. J., concurring).
260. Id. at 915, 936. As with the en banc opinion published in Layshock III, this opinion
involved a concurrence. Id. at 936; Layshock III, 650 F.3d at 219. It also included a dissent.
J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 941.
261. J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 936.
262. Id. at 933 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986)).
263. Id. at 925–26 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
507 (1969)).
264. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); Fraser, 478 U.S. at
685; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509; J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 926–27 (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007); Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 213–14
(3d Cir. 2001)).
265. J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 926 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509).
266. Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509).
267. See id. at 926–27 (citing Morse, 551 U.S. at 408; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506; Saxe, 240
F.3d at 213–14).
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ence was involved,268 while Kuhlmeier allowed discipline, for pedagogical
reasons of school sponsored speech.269 If neither of those categories were
applicable, Morse then established that speech which advocated illegal drug
use, even if off-campus but at a school sponsored event, could also be punished.270 Applying this analysis to the facts of the case, the court concluded
that none of the exceptions articulated by Fraser, Kuhlmeier, or Morse were
applicable.271 Thus, Tinker would be the only standard by which the school
could punish J.S.’s speech.272 However, the court concluded that the school
did not meet the “substantial disruption” test of Tinker, as the school had
conceded in the district court that no substantial disruption occurred.273 Furthermore, the court said that J.S.’s profile of McGonigle “was so outrageous
that no one could [or would] have taken it seriously . . . [t]hus it was . . . not
reasonably foreseeable” that a “substantial disruption” would occur.274 In
this way, the court concluded that J.S. ex rel Snyder III was distinguishable
from Doninger I and Wisnieswki.275
The Fourth Circuit also addressed this issue in July of 2011 with its decision in Kowalski I.276 Kara Kowalski, then a senior at Musselman High
School, created a MySpace page at home with her home computer, naming
the page “‘S.A.S.H.,’” which stated, “‘No No Herpes, We don’t want no
herpes.’”277 She invited one hundred or so of her friends to join the group
page; of this number, approximately two-dozen were students from Musselman High.278 A friend and classmate at Musselman High, Ray Parsons,
joined the group the day the page was created.279 He then uploaded a picture
of himself, holding his nose with a sign that said “‘Shay Has Herpes.’”280
This was a reference to another Musseleman High classmate, Shay N.281
268. Id. at 927 (citing Saxe, 240 F.3d at 213).
269. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273; see also J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 927 (citing
Saxe, 240 F.3d at 214).
270. J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 927 (citing Morse, 551 U.S. at 408).
271. Id. at 932, 932 n.10, 933.
272. Id. at 931–32.
273. Id. at 928.
274. Id. at 930.
275. J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 931 n.8; see also Doninger I, 527 F.3d 41, 50–51
(2d Cir. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499
(2011); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 35–36 (2d Cir. 2007).
276. Kowalski I, 652 F.3d 565, 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1095
(2012).
277. Id. at 567.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 568.
280. Id.
281. Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 567–68.
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According to the court, Parsons “had drawn red dots on Shay N.’s face to
simulate herpes and added a sign near her pelvic region, that read,
‘[w]arning: Enter at your own risk.’”282 “In the second photograph, he captioned Shay N.'s face with a sign that read, ‘portrait of a whore.’”283 Shay N.
learned of the page later that evening.284 Her father contacted Parsons, expressing his anger.285 Parsons contacted Kowalski, who tried to take the page
down but was not able to remove it.286
The next day, Shay N. and her parents went to Musselman High School
where they met with Vice Principal Becky Harden.287 They filed a complaint
of harassment with the school, and Shay then returned home, missing school
because she was uncomfortable attending classes with students who had
posted comments about her on Kowalski’s MySpace page.288 Ronald Stephens, the school’s Principal, “contacted the central school board . . . to determine whether” this was the type of behavior that should subject students
to school discipline.289 The office responded affirmatively, so the school
then conducted an investigation, interviewing the students involved with
creating, posting to, and viewing the website.290 After the investigation, the
school “concluded that Kowalski had created a ‘hate website’” that was in
violation of the Berkeley Board of Education’s Harassment, Bullying and
Intimidation Policy and its Student Code of Conduct.291 The harassment
policy defined bullying as
“[A]ny intentional gesture, or any intentional written, verbal or
physical act that”
1. A reasonable person under the circumstances should
know will have the effect of:
a. Harming a student or staff member;
...

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Published by NSUWorks, 2013

Id. at 568.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 568.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 568–69.
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2. Is sufficiently inappropriate, severe, persistent, or pervasive that it creates an intimidating, threatening, or abusive educational environment for a student.292

“The Student Code of Conduct [required], ‘[a]ll students . . . shall behave in
a safe manner that promotes a school environment that is nurturing, orderly,
safe, and conducive to learning and personal-social development.’”293 Violators of either policy were subject to various punishments—one such punishment was a ten-day suspension.294 Applying the harassment and conduct
policies to the facts, Stephens and Harden then “suspended Kowalski from
school for 10 days and issued . . . a 90-day ‘social suspension’” from school
extracurricular activities.295
Kowalski sued, arguing that the school had violated her First Amendment free speech rights.296 She argued that the school had disciplined her for
“‘off-campus, non-school related speech’” for which it had neither the right
nor the authority to punish her.297 The United States District Court for the
Northern District of West Virginia disagreed,298 and Kowalski appealed its
ruling to the Fourth Circuit.299
The Fourth Circuit defined the issue facing it as “whether Kowalski’s
activity fell within the outer boundaries of the high school’s legitimate interest in maintaining order in the school and protecting the well-being and educational rights of its students.”300 Concluding it did, the court affirmed the
district court’s decision, upholding the school’s punishment of Kowalski.301
While acknowledging that “[t]here is surely a limit to the scope of a high
school’s interest in the order, safety, and well-being of its students when the
speech . . . originates outside the schoolhouse gate,”302 the court concluded
that “the language of Tinker supports the conclusion that . . . schools have a
‘compelling interest’ in regulating speech that interferes with or disrupts the
work and discipline of the school, including discipline for student harassment
292. Id. at 569 (alteration in original).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 568–69.
296. Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 570.
297. Id. at 570–71.
298. See Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 12, Kowalski v.
Berkeley Cnty. Pub. Sch., No. 3:07-CV-147 (N.D. W. Va. Dec. 22, 2009), ECF No. 37.
299. Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 570.
300. Id. at 571.
301. Id. at 574 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513
(1969); Doninger I, 527 F.3d 41, 51–52 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 642 F.3d
334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011)).
302. Id. at 573.
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and bullying.”303 The court stated that while the Supreme Court of the United States had not yet dealt with a case in which one student targeted another
student for verbal abuse, it felt certain that Tinker would permit discipline for
such speech as it “‘disrupts classwork,’ creates ‘substantial disorder,’ or ‘collid[es] with’ or ‘inva[des]’ ‘the rights of others.’”304 According to the court,
the fact that the student speech involved occurred off-campus was not determinative of the ability of school administrators to impose discipline.305 Rather, the court stressed that Tinker permitted the school’s discipline because
Tinker allowed schools to intervene where student speech “materially and
substantially” interfered with school work and invaded the rights of others
“to be let alone.”306 Since Kowalski’s speech targeted a classmate, the court
proclaimed that it was “reasonably foreseeable” that the speech would impact students while at school and create substantial disruption.307
The last circuit court decision involved school discipline of a student for
off-campus speech that was eventually held to constitute a true threat.308
D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. was decided by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit.309 This case differs from Wisniewski, Doninger I, Layshock II, J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, and Kowalaski in that it involved behavior by
a student that did appear to constitute a true threat of physical violence
against other students.310 While the other five decisions involved off-campus
student speech directed at school personnel or students whose behavior was
disliked, D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. involved behavior that was perceived to constitute an actual threat to the physical well-being of school personnel and students.311
303. Id. at 572 (citing DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 319–20 (3d Cir. 2008)).
304. Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 571–72 (alteration in original) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at
513).
305. Id. at 574.
306. Id. at 573–74 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508, 513).
307. Id. at 574.
308. D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 764 (8th Cir.
2011).
309. Id. at 755.
310. Compare id. at 756–59, with Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 567–68, and J.S. ex rel. Snyder
III, 650 F.3d 915, 920 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012), and
Layshock II, 593 F.3d 249, 252–53 (3d Cir.), vacated en banc, reh’g granted en banc, No. 074465, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012), and Doninger I, 527 F.3d 41, 44–
46 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
499 (2011), and Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 35–36 (2d Cir. 2007).
311. Compare D.J.M. ex rel. D.M., 647 F.3d at 756–59, with Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 567–
68, and J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 920, and Layshock II, 593 F.3d at 252–53, and
Doninger I, 527 F.3d at 44, and Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 35–36.
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D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. involved a decision in which a student, D.J.M., was
chatting via instant message with another classmate, C.M.312 During the
chat, D.J.M. told C.M. that he was going to get a gun and kill certain classmates.313 He named specific students that he would “get rid of.”314 Named
individuals included “a particular boy along with his older brother and some
individual members of groups he did not like, namely ‘midget[s],’ ‘fags,’ and
‘negro bitches.’”315 Concerned, C.M. contacted a school administrator, forwarding D.J.M’s emails.316 This resulted in D.J.M. being arrested by the
police and detained in the psychiatric ward of the Lakeland Regional Hospital for a month.317 After his release from the hospital, D.J.M. attempted to
return to school, but he was initially suspended for ten days for making true
threats.318 After numerous parents expressed concern and demanded action,
a school board hearing resulted in the suspension of D.J.M. for the remainder
of the school year.319
While D.J.M. argued that the school suspension violated his First
Amendment free speech rights, the school disputed this, arguing that
D.J.M.’s speech constituted a true threat, which violated the school’s conduct
policy and was not protected by the First Amendment.320 The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri held that “the evidence
before the [c]ourt is that school was substantially disrupted because of Plaintiff’s threats. Under the Tinker test, Defendants could punish Plaintiff for his
disruptive statements without violating his First Amendment rights.”321 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the lower
court’s decision, concluding that “[t]rue threats are not protected under the
First Amendment . . . [H]ere [the school] was given enough information that
it reasonably feared D.J.M. had access to a handgun and was thinking about
shooting specific classmates at the high school.”322
Three of the above decisions, Doninger II, J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, and
Kowalski I, were appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States during

312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
2010).
322.
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D.J.M. ex rel. D.M., 647 F.3d at 757.
Id. at 758.
Id.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id. at 759.
D.J.M. ex rel. D.M., 647 F.3d at 759.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 759–60.
Mardis v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1124 (E.D. Mo.
D.J.M. ex rel. D.M., 647 F.3d at 764.
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the 2011–2012 term.323 Despite what appears to be confusion, or what some
would term a circuit split,324 the Court denied certiorari in all three cases.325

323. See generally Kowalski I, 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1095
(2012); J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
1097 (2012); Doninger II, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011).
324. McCarthy, supra note 45, at 1; see also Philip T.K. Daniel & Scott Greytak, A Need
to Sharpen the Contours of Off-Campus Student Speech, 273 EDUC. L. REP. 21, 36 (2011).
325. See Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder (J.S. ex rel. Snyder IV), 132 S. Ct.
1097, 1097 (2012); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch. (Kowalski II), 132 S. Ct. 1095, 1095
(2012); Doninger v. Niehoff (Doninger III), 132 S. Ct. 499, 499 (2011). In her petition to the
Supreme Court for certiorari, Avery Doninger, citing Layshock I and J.S. ex rel. Snyder III,
among other cases, argued that the “divergent holdings [among the Second and Third Circuits]
represent[ed] an actual concrete split . . . which this Court should resolve sooner rather than
later.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, 16, Doninger v. Niehoff, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011)
(No. 11-113). Meanwhile, Niehoff, in the Respondents’ Brief in Opposition, argued that
Doninger’s behavior satisfied the Tinker standard of “substantial disruption” and denied that a
conflict between the circuits existed. Respondents’ Brief in Opposition at 20–22, Doninger v.
Niehoff, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011) (No. 11-113). Blue Mountain School District also filed a
petition, requesting certiorari. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1, Blue Mountain Sch. Dist.
v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012) (No. 11-502). Citing both the en banc and panel
decisions of the Third Circuit, Blue Mountain argued there was not only a circuit split, but
also a deepening split within the Third Circuit. Id. at 1, 14. The school also argued that lower
district courts were split on the issue as to whether Tinker’s standard applied to student speech
that originated off-campus. Id. at 15. Interestingly enough, J.S./Snyder’s respondent’s Brief
in Opposition argued, as did the school’s brief in Doninger III, that there was no split among
the courts as they applied Tinker to off-campus student speech. See Brief in Opposition at 2,
Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012) (No. 11-502). Kowalski too petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for certiorari, arguing, as did the
Blue Mountain School District, that there was a split among the courts as to whether Tinker
applied to off-campus speech not directed at the school. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2–
3, Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012) (No. 11-461). She also requested
that the Court clarify the meaning of Tinker’s “substantial disruption” test. See id. Berkeley
School District responded, arguing—as did the student J.S. in J.S. ex rel. Snyder—that there
was no circuit court split and that the Fourth Circuit had applied the First Amendment analysis
as intended. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, 30, Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012) (No. 11-461). The Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project, the Alliance Defense Fund and Liberty Institute, and the Rutherford Institute all
filed amicus curiae briefs to support Kowalski, urging the Court to hear the case and clarify
the analysis. See Motion for Leave to File Brief in Support of Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari
and Brief of Amicus Curiae Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project at 1–2, Kowalski v.
Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012) (No. 11-461); Motion for Leave to File Brief as
Amici Curiae and Brief for the Alliance Defense Fund and Liberty Institute as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioner at 2–3, Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012) (No.
11-461); Motion of the Rutherford Institute for Leave to File an Amicus Curiae Brief and
Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Petitioner at 2, 14, Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 132 S.
Ct. 1095 (2012) (No. 11-461). The Court denied certiorari in all three cases. J.S. ex rel. Snyder IV, 132 S. Ct. at 1097; Kowalski II, 132 S. Ct. at 1095; Doninger III, 132 S. Ct. at 499.
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District Courts: More Confusion?

If the decisions from the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits appear confusing and inconsistent,326
an examination of nine decisions rendered by various United States District
Courts across the country from 2002 to 2011 and the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court reveals more inconsistency. This section will review eight cases decided by United States District Courts, in reverse chronological order, as well
as a decision from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that involved school
discipline of what originated as off-campus student cyberspeech.
Most recently, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Indiana issued an opinion in T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Community
School Corporation.327 In T.V. ex rel. B.V., several teenage girls at Churubusco High School, who played on the school’s volleyball team, held slumber parties.328 At these parties, T.V. and other girls posed for various pictures
that the court described as “raunchy.”329
The girls posted pictures of themselves on Facebook, MySpace, and
Photo Bucket licking “phallic-shaped rainbow colored lollipops,” holding
trident-shaped objects from their crotches, putting them in their buttocks, and
kneeling beside one another “as if engaging in anal sex.”330 The pictures
came to the attention of other classmates who also played on the volleyball
team.331 Some classmates disapproved and then showed the web pages to
their parents.332 Some parents then contacted the school to complain about
T.V. and M.K. being allowed to play on the volleyball team.333 After reviewing the school’s extracurricular policy, which required that students “‘demonstrate good conduct at school and outside of school,’”334 the school suspended T.V. and M.K. from participating in extracurricular activities, i.e.
playing on the volleyball team, for part of the school year.335 While the girls
argued that the school was violating their First Amendment rights, the school
stated, “‘[t]he basis for the suspension was the determination that the photo326. See discussion supra Part II.C.
327. 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 767 (N.D. Ind. 2011).
328. Id. at 771.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 772.
331. See id.
332. T.V. ex rel. B.V., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 772.
333. Id. at 772–73.
334. Id. at 773 (“‘If you act in a manner in school or out of school that brings discredit or
dishonor upon yourself or your school, you may be removed from extracurricular activities.’”).
335. Id. at 773–74.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol37/iss2/2

36

Smith-Butler: Walking the Regulatory Tightrope: Balancing Bullies' Free Speech

2013]

WALKING THE REGULATORY TIGHTROPE

279

graphs were inappropriate, and that by posing for them and posting them on
the internet, the students were reflecting discredit upon the school.’”336 Acknowledging that “the speech in this case doesn’t exactly call to mind highminded civic discourse about current events,”337 the court agreed with T.V.
that her First Amendment rights had been violated.338 After concluding that
T.V.’s photographs were indeed speech protected by the First Amendment,339
the court then rejected the school’s argument that the photographs were obscene and constituted child pornography.340 Having concluded that the
speech was protected, the court then applied Fraser and Tinker to determine
whether T.V.’s posting of photographs on Facebook could be punished by
school officials.341 Since the speech was off-campus, the court concluded
that Fraser was not applicable.342 Concluding that Tinker was the appropriate standard to be applied, the court noted that Tinker’s “substantial disruption” test was not met.343 The court stated that “no reasonable jury could
conclude that the photos of T.V. and M.K. posted on the internet caused a
substantial disruption to school activities, or that there was a reasonably foreseeable chance of future substantial disruption” since only a few parents had
complained.344 The court noted that “substantial disruption” required “‘more
than the ordinary personality conflicts among’” school children.345
In 2010, three student cyberspeech cases, Evans v. Bayer,346 J.C. ex rel.
R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified School District,347 and Mardis v. Hannibal Public School District No. 60,348 involved school punishment of students for offcampus cyberspeech.349 Stretching from coast to coast and including the
336. Id. at 774.
337. T.V. ex rel. B.V., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 771.
338. Id. at 790.
339. Id. at 776.
340. Id. at 778.
341. Id. at 779–80; see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683, 685
(1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
342. T.V. ex rel. B.V., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 779 (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688 (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
343. Id. at 783–84 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509, 514).
344. Id. at 784.
345. See id. (quoting J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d
1094, 1119 (C.D. Cal. 2010)).
346. 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
347. 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
348. 684 F. Supp. 2d 1114 (E.D. Mo. 2010). Mardis was appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit where an opinion was issued. D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v.
Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 2011). For a discussion of the
case and the opinion of the Eighth Circuit, see infra, notes 381–91.
349. J.C. ex rel. R.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1098; Evans, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1367; Mardis,
684 F. Supp. 2d at 1115.
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heartland, the decisions ranged in geography, from the Southern District of
Florida to the Central District of California, with a stop in Missouri to demonstrate student cyberspeech was an issue across America rather than just an
urban bi-coastal problem.350
The Evans decision involved Katherine Evans, a high school senior at
Pembroke Pines Charter School, who created a Facebook page and named it
“Ms. Sarah Phelps is the worst teacher I’ve ever met.”351 She invited students “to express your feelings of hatred” about Ms. Phelps at the site.352
While “[t]he page included Ms. Phelps’ photograph,” it “did not contain
threats of violence.”353 Students posted to the site, in support of Ms. Phelps
while dismissing Evans’ comments.354 Two days later, Evans removed the
post, but the posting still came to Peter Bayer’s attention.355 Bayer, the high
school principal, reviewed the post and concluded that Evans had violated
the school policy regarding “‘Bullying/Cyberbullying/Harassment towards a
staff member’ and ‘Disruptive behavior.’”356 Because of this, he suspended
Evans for three days and removed her from her advanced placement classes.357
Evans sued, arguing she was punished by the school for exercising her
First Amendment speech rights.358 The court framed the issued as “whether
the fact that Plaintiff’s speech was arguably aimed at a particular audience at
the school is enough by itself to label the speech on-campus speech.”359
Analyzing the facts under Tinker and applying the Morse quartet’s holdings,
the court found that Evans’s First Amendment rights had been violated, concluding, “Evans’s speech falls under the wide umbrella of protected speech.
It was an opinion of a student about a teacher, that was published offcampus, did not cause any disruption on-campus, and was not lewd, vulgar,
threatening, or advocating illegal or dangerous behavior.”360

350. J.C. ex rel. R.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1094; Evans, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1365; Mardis,
684 F. Supp. 2d at 1114; see also Bullying Statistics 2010, BULLYING STAT.,
http://www.bullyingstatistics.org/content/bullying-statistics-2010.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2013).
351. Evans, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1367.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Evans, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1367.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 1368.
359. Id. at 1371.
360. Id. at 1374; see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007).
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J.C. ex rel. R.C. involved student on student misbehavior.361 In J.C. ex
rel. R.C., J.C. and several of her classmates went to a restaurant after school
ended.362 While there, they discussed and made comments about classmates.363 A classmate, C.C., who was not present at the restaurant, was
called a “‘slut,’” “‘spoiled,’” and “‘the ugliest piece of shit I’ve ever seen in
my whole life.’”364 While this conversation ensued, J.C. recorded it with her
video camera.365 After she went home, she then uploaded the four and a half
minute video rant against C.C. and posted it on YouTube.366 She invited five
to ten students from Beverly Hills High to view it.367 J.C. also contacted
C.C. directly, telling her to view it.368 C.C. viewed it, was upset, and took
her mother in to complain to the principal the next day.369 The students who
viewed the video did so from their homes with home computers since access
to YouTube was blocked at school.370 The school investigated and consulted
“the [local] Director of Pupil Personnel for the District.”371 The director indicated that the student could be suspended; the school then suspended J.C.
for two days.372
J.C. sued the school district, arguing the school “violated her First
Amendment rights.”373 The school district disagreed, arguing J.C.’s conduct
caused a “substantial disruption” as required by Tinker.374 The court reviewed and examined Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse, concluding
that Tinker’s analysis governed.375 The court rejected J.C.’s “geographybased argument,” holding that “Tinker applies to both on-campus and offcampus student speech.”376 In its analysis, the court emphasized the importance of the “substantial disruption” test in determining whether schools
could regulate off-campus student speech.377 Applying Tinker to the facts of
361. J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1098
(C.D. Cal. 2010).
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. J.C. ex rel. R.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1098.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. See id. at 1099.
371. J.C. ex rel. R.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1099.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 1097, 1100.
374. See id. at 1119.
375. Id. at 1103, 1109–10.
376. J.C. ex rel. R.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1107–08.
377. Id. at 1104, 1107–08.
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the case, the court concluded that J.C.’s conduct was “too de minimis . . . to
constitute a substantial disruption.”378 Rather Tinker’s “substantial disruption” required “something more than the ordinary personality conflicts
among middle school students that may leave one student feeling hurt or
insecure.”379 Thus, the school could not punish J.C.’s speech since it failed
to satisfy Tinker’s substantial disruption test.380
While the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit later
weighed in and upheld the lower court’s decision in D.J.M. ex rel. D.M.,381
this section will offer a brief discussion of the decision in the case from the
lower court. Mardis came out of Missouri.382 It involved an off-campus
student instant message exchange between D.J.M. and a classmate, Carly
Moore.383 During the chat, D.J.M. told Moore “that he was going to get a
gun and kill certain classmates.”384 Moore was truly concerned so she contacted a school administrator.385 The police then arrested D.J.M. and detained him in the psychiatric ward at Lakeland Regional Hospital.386 Once
released, D.J.M. was initially suspended for ten days for making threats.387
The superintendent then extended his suspension for the remainder of the
school year.388
Angry, D.J.M. sued the school district, arguing that his instant messages
did not constitute “true threats,” and thus the school’s suspension violated his
First Amendment free speech.389 The school disputed this, arguing that
D.J.M.’s speech constituted a true threat, which was not protected by the
First Amendment.390 The court agreed with the school district.391
In 2007, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington dealt with off-campus student cyberspeech in Requa v. Kent
School District No. 415.392 Gregory Requa was a high school junior at Ken378.
379.
380.
381.
2011).
382.
2010).
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
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Id. at 1117.
Id. at 1119.
Id. at 1122.
D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 767 (8th Cir.
Mardis v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1114 (E.D. Mo.
Id. at 1115.
Id.
Id. at 1122.
Id. at 1115.
Mardis, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1115–16.
Id. at 1116.
Id. at 1119; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Mardis, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1119; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Mardis, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1119.
492 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1272, 1274 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
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tridge High School when he allegedly “surreptitiously” recorded his high
school teacher in her classroom.393 While standing behind Ms. M., Requa
made faces, put up rabbit ears, “and ma[de] pelvic thrusts in her general direction.”394 He filmed the teacher’s buttocks and referred to them as “booty.”395 He then edited the recording, adding commentary about the teacher’s
hygiene.396 He uploaded and posted the recording to YouTube, where it languished until a local Seattle news station did a story about high school students who posted videos to YouTube that were critical of teachers.397 During
the development of this story, the reporter “contacted the Kentridge administration for comment.”398 The news station then included Requa’s YouTube
clip in its broadcast to the Seattle area.399
The school then conducted an investigation to satisfy its administrative
policies and determine which student, either Requa or S.W., had made the
recordings.400 Requa denied that he had been involved in the “filming, editing or posting [of] the video,” but four unnamed students disputed this.401
The school then suspended Requa for forty days, indicating his suspension
resulted from the filming of Ms. M. in class.402 The school’s handbook prohibited “sexual harassment” and the school concluded that the pelvic thrusts
and shots of Ms. M’s buttocks constituted sexual harassment.403 After a
school hearing and an appeal to the Board of Directors, the punishment was
upheld.404
Requa sued, alleging violation of his First Amendment rights and arguing that he had a right to criticize his teacher.405 The school district again
affirmed its defense, which was that Requa was punished for his behavior in
class, i.e., “secretly filming the teacher,” rather than his internet posting.406
The court established that Tinker’s “substantial disruption” was the applicable test to determine whether Requa’s in-class behavior was protected

393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
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Id.
Requa, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1274.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Requa, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1275–76.
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Id.
See id. at 1273, 1276, 1279.
Id. at 1277.
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speech.407 Examining Requa’s behavior, which consisted of standing behind
a teacher in class and filming her while “making ‘rabbit ears’ and pelvic
thrusts,” the court concluded that Requa’s behavior satisfied Tinker’s “substantial disruption” test.408 Thus, his speech was unlikely to be “protected
speech” within the meaning of Tinker.409 Ultimately the school prevailed, as
the court noted that Requa’s “admitted free speech activities outside the
classroom—posting a link to the YouTube video on the internet—are protected speech and the school district agrees that he may not be disciplined for
[his] out-of-school expression of his viewpoint.”410 This is an example of the
existing confusion about the application of Tinker to off-campus student cyberspeech. While the United States District Court for the Central District of
California says that Tinker is applicable to off-campus student speech that
arrives on campus,411 the United States District Court for the Western District
of Washington indicates that Tinker is not applicable to off-campus student
speech.412
In 2003, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania confronted an off-campus student cyberspeech issue in Flaherty v. Keystone Oaks School District.413 “Jack Flaherty, Jr. posted three messages from . . . home and one from school” to a public message board discussing, in juvenile terms, his school’s volleyball team.414 Once the school
coaches learned of the postings, Flaherty was disciplined based on a policy
that defined harassment as “any ongoing pattern of abuse, whether physical
or verbal.”415 Flaherty sued, arguing the school policies used to punish his
off-campus conduct and speech were overreaching and “unconstitutionally
overbroad and vague [so] that they fail to limit a school official’s authority to
discipline.”416 Examining the school’s policy in light of the mandates of
Tinker, the court concluded that the discipline policy was both overbroad and

407. Requa, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1280 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969); Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir.
2001)).
408. Id. (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513).
409. Id. at 1279 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986);
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513).
410. Id. at 1283.
411. J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1094,
1105, 1107–08 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
412. Requa, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1272, 1283.
413. 247 F. Supp. 2d 698, 698, 700 (W.D. Pa. 2003).
414. Id. at 700.
415. Id. at 700, 701 & n.3.
416. Id. at 701, 705.
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vague in its definition and application.417 The court announced that the policy failed to follow Tinker’s mandate and limit the authority of the school to
discipline student expression except in cases of “substantial disruption.”418
Instead, the court stated that the discipline policy “could be interpreted to
prohibit a substantial amount of protected speech.”419 Thus, the court granted
Flaherty’s motion for summary judgment.420
In 2002, two federal district court cases involved student cyberspeech,
as did a decision from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.421 Coy ex rel. Coy v.
Board of Education422 involved a middle school student named Jon Coy.423
While at home, using his own computer, Coy created a website, posting “pictures and biographical information” about himself and some of his school
friends.424 The site also contained a section named “losers” and included
pictures of classmates with derogatory sentences under the photos.425 Specifically, “[t]he ‘losers’ section contained the pictures of three boys who attended the North Canton Middle School. . . . Most objectionable was a sentence describing one boy as being sexually aroused by his mother.”426 Middle school students learned of the website and eventually reported it to the
math teacher, who reported it to the principal, Mr. Stanley.427 Nothing was
done until Coy accessed the website from the school’s computer lab.428 After
that, Stanley suspended Coy for four days for violating the school’s student
conduct code and internet policy.429 The school found that Coy violated the
following portion of the student conduct code: “‘Inappropriate Action or
Behavior: Any action or behavior judged by school officials to be inappropriate and not specifically mentioned in other sections shall be in violation of
the Student Conduct Code.’”430

417. Id. at 704, 705; see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
509 (1969).
418. Flaherty, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 704; see also Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
419. Flaherty, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 706.
420. Id.
421. Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 781 (E.D. Mich. 2002);
Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 794–95 (N.D. Ohio 2002); J.S. ex rel.
H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 850 (Pa. 2002).
422. 205 F. Supp. 2d 791 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
423. Id. at 794.
424. Id. at 795.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Coy ex rel. Coy, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 795.
428. Id. at 795–96.
429. Id. at 796.
430. Id.
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Coy and his parents sued.431 Coy argued that the school disciplined
him, not for viewing the website at school, but rather for the content of the
website, which was created off-campus and thus constituted protected speech
under Tinker.432 The school disputed this, saying that it punished Coy because he violated school policy.433 Discussing both Tinker’s and Fraser’s
requirements, the court refused to grant the school summary judgment, indicating that it must demonstrate a substantial disruption in order to discipline
Coy’s speech.434
In November of 2002, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan also dealt with a student cyberspeech issue in Mahaffey
ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich.435 Joshua Mahaffey, a high school student, created a website with another student and named it ‘“Satan’s web page.’”436
The site stated “‘[s]tab someone for no reason then set them on fire throw
them off of a cliff, watch them suffer and with their last breath, just before
everything goes black, spit on their face. Killing people is wrong don’t do It
[sic]. unless [sic] Im [sic] there to watch.’”437
A parent of another student at the school learned of the web site and reported it to the police.438 The police investigated and were told that computers at the high school “‘may have been used to create the website.’”439
The police then notified the school.440 The school then began an investigation, and Mahaffey indicated that he created the website “‘for laughs’” and
because he was “bored.”441 The school’s investigation centered upon Mahaffey’s conduct that was alleged to violate the school’s code of conduct.442
After the investigation, the principal, Carol Baldwin, recommended expulsion because Mahaffey’s behavior violated the school’s Conduct Policy
which prohibited “‘[b]ehavior [d]angerous to [the] [s]elf and [o]thers.’”443
431. Id. at 794.
432. Coy ex rel. Coy, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 794, 797 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
433. Id. at 794, 796.
434. Id. at 799–801.
435. 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 779, 781–82 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
436. Id. at 781.
437. Id. at 782.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 782.
441. Id. at 781.
442. Id. at 782.
443. Id. The school advised Mahaffey that “‘based upon the admitted and alleged violation of Categories 5-Behavior Dangerous to Self and Others, 23-Internet Violations and 24Intimidation and Threats of the Waterford School District Code of Conduct’” he was being
expelled. Id.
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The school then recommended expulsion but offered to provide a hearing.444
Mahaffey sued, arguing that the school’s conduct violated his First Amendment rights.445 The court, applying the Tinker analysis, agreed with Mahaffey.446 When analyzing and applying Tinker, the court concluded that
Mahaffey’s activity had to have occurred on or with school property in order
for the school to have taken action.447 In addition to the geography requirement, the Tinker test would require that Mahaffey’s behavior must then have
created a substantial disruption to the work of the school.448 Only after establishing this could the school discipline Mahaffey for his speech.449 Applying
Tinker to the facts at hand, the court announced that the school produced no
evidence that Mahaffey used school equipment to make his website nor had
it established that Mahaffey communicated its existence to others at the
school.450 It stated:
[R]egulation of Plaintiff’s speech on the website without any proof
of disruption to the school or on campus activity in the creation of
the website was a violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment shall be
granted on his free speech and free expression claims.451

The last case to be discussed in this section involved a decision handed
down by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem
Area School District452 in 2002.453 J.S., an eighth grade student, created a
website on his home computer, from home, and titled it “Teacher Sux.”454 It
made derogatory comments about the school’s algebra teacher, Mrs. Fulmer,
and the school principal.455 On the website, J.S. posted a question that asked
“‘Why Should She Die?’”456 Beneath the heading, J.S. then requested “‘$20
to help pay for the hitman.’”457 In addition to other comments and diagrams,
444. Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 782–83.
445. Id. at 781.
446. See id. at 784, 786.
447. See id. at 783–84.
448. Id. at 784 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509
(1969)).
449. Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 784.
450. Id. at 786.
451. Id.
452. 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002).
453. Id. at 847.
454. Id. at 850–51.
455. Id. at 851.
456. Id.
457. J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 851.
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the final page of the website showed a “drawing of Mrs. Fulmer with her
head cut off and blood dripping from her neck.”458 Students, faculty, and
administrators at the school viewed the website.459 Mrs. Fulmer testified that
the website frightened her, and that she was afraid “someone would try to
kill her.”460 She went on medical leave which meant that three substitute
teachers had to finish teaching her class, creating a substantial disruption in
the educational process.461
While the school knew of the website before the school year ended in
May, it did not take action until July.462 In July, the school notified J.S. and
his parents that he would be suspended for three days.463 Why was he being
suspended? The school said “that J.S. violated School District policy [with
a] threat to a teacher, harassment of a teacher and principal, and disrespect to
a teacher and principal, each resulting in actual harm to the health, safety,
and welfare of the school community.”464 The school district conducted a
hearing and then suspended J.S. for ten days.465 Shortly thereafter, it expelled J.S.466
J.S. then appealed the district’s decision.467 The Court of Common
Pleas affirmed the school’s discipline and the Commonwealth Court upheld
their decision.468 J.S. then appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.469
While J.S. argued that the school’s behavior violated his First Amendment
rights, the school disagreed, saying that J.S.’s speech was not entitled to First
Amendment protection since it constituted a true threat.470 As the court analyzed the facts, it agreed with J.S. that his speech did not constitute a true
threat since the school failed to take action for several months after learning
about the website.471 Thus, the court concluded that the Tinker analysis was
appropriate.472 As the court understood Tinker, it believed that it must first
determine whether the speech occurred on-campus as it appeared to believe

458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
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Id. at 851–52.
Id. at 852.
Id.
J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 850, 852.
Id. at 852.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 853.
J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 853.
Id. at 869.
Id. at 847, 853.
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that Tinker was inapplicable to off-campus student speech.473 Determining
that J.S. had accessed the website while at school from school computers, the
court concluded that the nexus between off-campus speech and on-campus
access was satisfied.474 Lastly, the court had to determine whether J.S.’s
speech created a “substantial disruption” as required by Tinker.475 Given the
nature of the statements made on the website, the court announced that the
uproar generated by students, parents, and school staff because of the website
did indeed result in a substantial disruption in the work of the school.476 Applying the Tinker analysis, the court announced that the school did not violate J.S.’s First Amendment rights, stating “we find that the School District’s
disciplinary action[s] taken against J.S. did not violate his First Amendment
right to freedom of speech.”477
As the above facts and holdings demonstrate, courts are interpreting and
applying the Tinker analysis in various ways that do not seem to be consistent.478 Some courts indicate that Tinker applies to both on and off-campus
student speech while others courts conclude that it applies only to on-campus
speech.479 Facts that establish a “substantial disruption” vary from district to
district.480 Sometimes the geographic location of the speech is determinative,
while at other times courts consider the nexus between the off-campus
speech and the on-campus impact when deciding if Tinker is applicable.481 If
the lack of clarity from the cases is not sufficient, the article will next consider the impact of the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights’
laws and interpretations regarding harassment as well as state legislation that

473. Id. at 864.
474. Id. at 865.
475. Id. at 868–69.
476. Id. at 869.
477. J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 869.
478. See, e.g., Kowalski I, 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1095
(2012); J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 869.
479. Compare Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 574, with J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 865.
480. Compare Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 574, with J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 869.
481. Compare Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 574, with J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 865. The K–
12 student speech and school discipline cases continue to arise and head into court. See, e.g.,
Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 567. Three appellate briefs involving schools and student speech cited
to Tinker. Brief of Appellees at 13–22, C.H. ex rel. Hardwick v. Heyward, No. 12–1445 (4th
Cir. Aug. 17, 2012); Brief of Appellants at 21, Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., No. 12–
60264 (5th Cir. June 6, 2012) [hereinafter Brief of Appellants, Bell]; Brief of Appellees at 21–
33, Wynar v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 11–17127 (9th Cir. May 7, 2012) [hereinafter
Brief of Appellees, Wynar]. Another case involving school discipline and student speech was
decided on September 6, 2012. R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, No.
12–588, 2012 WL 3870868, at *1 (D. Minn. Sept. 6, 2012).
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mandates school boards provide “safe” schools.482 Both the Department of
Education and several state legislatures not only ask, but require, public
schools to enact and enforce certain policies that involve schools with offcampus student cyberspeech.483 Are these regulations and legislation, at both
the state and federal levels, constitutional, given the various interpretations
of the Supreme Court decisions about off-campus student cyberspeech?
III. THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION’S OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS
If interpreting and applying the legal analysis required by the Morse
quartet is confusing,484 add more confusion to the analysis when the antiharassment provisions, monitored by the Department of Education’s Office
for Civil Rights, are thrown into the mixture.485 In 2010, the Department of
Education drafted a DCL486 that lauded efforts by school boards to deal with
the harmful effects of bullying.487 However, the letter warned schools not to
forget that some behaviors, labeled as bullying, actually constituted peer
harassment on the basis of “race, color, national origin, sex, and disability.”488 Understanding the distinction between what constitutes bullying and
what constitutes harassment is crucial because the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights concerns itself with the imposition of liability
for peer harassment that is “based on race, color, national origin, sex or disability.”489 The Department of Education reminded schools of their legal
obligations regarding the enforcement of civil rights statutes by the Depart482. See discussion infra Part III. The Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights
enforces civil rights laws for programs that receive federal funding from the Department of
Education. OCR: Know Your Rights, supra note 3; see also 20 U.S.C. § 3413(a) (2006).
Because of this, the Department of Education interacts with school administrators for elementary and secondary schools, vocational schools, colleges and universities, proprietary schools,
state education agencies, libraries, and museums. OCR: Know Your Rights, supra note 3.
The Office for Civil Rights enforces the statutes “prohibit[ing] discrimination on the basis of
race, color [or] national origin, sex, [and] disability.” Id.; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a); 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000d, 12131(2).
483. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 160.775 (2012); OCR: Know Your Rights, supra note 3.
484. See Dickler, supra note 92, at 380–81.
485. OCR: Know Your Rights, supra note 3.
486. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 80, at 1. This letter is occasionally referred to as
the DCL in other texts. Letter from Francisco M. Negrón, Jr., Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Sch. Bds.
Ass’n, to Charlie Rose, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. 1 (Dec. 7, 2010) [hereinafter Negrón Letter], available at http://www.nsba.org/schoollaw/issues/nsba-letter-to-ed-12-0710.pdf.
487. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 80, at 1.
488. Id. at 1–2.
489. Id.
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ment of Education’s Office for Civil Rights.490 Failure to meet these obligations could result in the imposition of liability.491 Schools, coping with students’ First Amendment rights and state legislatures’ anti-bullying statutes,
must also deal with the Department of Education’s peer harassment requirements.492 What happens when there is a conflict? This section will explore
those topics.
By 2010, the topic of school bullying had become so widespread and
public493 that the Assistant Secretary for the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights, Russlynn Ali, spoke to the subject with a DCL on October 26, 2010.494 Directed to “state departments of education and local
school districts,” the letter applauded the anti-bullying efforts made by these
organizations, noting: “Bullying fosters a climate of fear and disrespect that
can seriously impair the physical and psychological health of its victims and
create conditions that negatively affect learning, thereby undermining the
ability of students to achieve their full potential.”495 The letter indicated that
some behavior that would fall under a school’s anti-bullying policy might
also “trigger responsibilit[y] under one or more of the federal antidiscrimination laws enforced by the Department[] [of Education].”496 The Department
of Education then warned schools to not only address student conduct that
fell under its bullying policies, but also to consider whether such conduct
resulted in discriminatory harassment.497
According to the letter, labels used by schools to pigeon-hole behavior
were not determinative as to how a school was expected to respond to an
incident.498 The letter advised schools to impartially investigate incidents
from a perspective of ascertaining whether the conduct involved harassment
that was based on “race, color, national origin, sex, [or] disability.”499 To
further explain, the Department of Education indicated that “[h]arassing conduct [could] take many forms.”500 It suggested the following examples:
• “verbal acts and name-calling;”
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• “graphic and written statements, which may include the use of cell
phones or the [i]nternet;”
• “or other conduct that may be physically threatening, harmful, or humiliating.”501
The letter stated that “[h]arassment does not have to include intent to harm,
be directed at a specific target, or involve repeated incidents.”502 Instead,
“[h]arassment creates a hostile environment when the conduct is sufficiently
severe, pervasive, or persistent so as to interfere with or limit a student’s
ability to participate in or benefit from the services, activities, or opportunities offered by a school.”503 The letter then explained that “[w]hen such harassment is based on race, color, national origin, sex, or disability, it violates
the civil rights laws that [the Office for Civil Rights] enforces.”504
After defining harassment, the letter told schools that “[a] school is responsible for addressing harassment incidents about which it knows or reasonably should have known. . . . When responding to harassment, a school
must take immediate and appropriate action to investigate or otherwise determine what occurred.”505 If the school determined there had been discriminatory harassment, it was advised to “take prompt and effective steps . . . to
end the harassment.”506 Punishment of the student offender would not necessarily suffice.507 Instead, the school has a responsibility to discover and eradicate the problem, handle the transgressors, provide training, and put a program in place to see that the harassment did not reoccur.508
Concerned about the implications of the above letter, Francisco M. Negrón, General Counsel for the National School Boards Association, responded on December 7, 2010, writing to Charlie Rose, the Department of
Education’s General Counsel.509 The letter began by stating the Board’s fear
“that absent clarification, the [Department of Education’s] expansive reading
of the law as stated in the DCL will invite misguided litigation.”510 Referring
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Educa-
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tion,511 the letter noted that Davis imposed liability only upon the demonstration that the school had actual knowledge of the harassment, while the October 10th Department of Education letter provided for the imposition of liability for harassment about which the school knows or reasonably should have
known.512 Besides the distinction between actual knowledge and the standard
of should have known, the letter further noted that:
Davis holds that only “harassment that is so severe, pervasive,
and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim’s access
to an educational opportunity or benefit” may result in [the imposition of] liability for the school district. The DCL, in contrast,
states the following: “Harassment creates a hostile environment
when the conduct is sufficiently severe, pervasive, or persistent so
as to interfere with or limit a student’s ability to participate in or
benefit from the services, activities, or opportunities offered by
the school.”513

On page six, Negrón’s letter noted that the Department of Education’s October 26th letter only minimally acknowledged the limitations of schools to
discipline students regarding harassment when students’ First Amendment
free speech rights were involved.514 Negrón wrote:
[S]chool districts may discipline students within the limitations of
First Amendment for on-campus, non-school sponsored speech in
the following instances only: if the speech is likely to cause a
“substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities” or the speech collides with “the rights of other students to
be secure and . . . let alone;” if the speech is “sexually explicit, indecent or lewd;” or if it “can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use.”515

Because of the Morse quartet, Negrón argued that many state legislatures,
when enacting cyberbullying or bullying legislation, attempted to define bullying, cyberbullying, and harassment in such a way that the terms did not run
afoul of the meaning and application of students’ First Amendment rights as
delineated by the Morse quartet.516 However, Negrón argued that the De511.
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526 U.S. 629 (1999).
Negrón Letter, supra note 486, at 2; see also Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 80, at
Negrón Letter, supra note 486, at 2–3.
Id. at 1, 6.
Id. at 6 (footnotes omitted).
See id.; see also Dickler, supra note 92, at 361–62.
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partment of Education’s interpretation, enforcement, and imposition of liability upon schools for violating the Department’s Civil Rights’ laws showed no
such understanding.517 How could a school deal with Snyder’s hate speech
without running afoul of the Department’s Civil Rights’ laws?518 It was indeed a dilemma.
IV. STATE ANTI-BULLYING LAWS
Between 1995 and April 2011, forty-six states enacted legislation to
deal with bullying.519 A quick look at the state legislation indicates that state
legislatures have frequently used “harassment” and “bullying” interchangeably.520 Given the specific legal definition of “harassment” as enforced by the
Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights,521 more confusion ensues.522 Some states apply the legislation to off-campus speech while others
do not.523 Some address cyberspeech while others ignore it.524
In December of 2011, the Department of Education released a report,
Analysis of State Bullying Laws and Policies.525 The study states that between 1999 and 2010, there were over one hundred and twenty bills introduced or amended by state legislatures to either require schools or the juvenile justice system to deal with bullying.526 While some of these laws require
discipline by schools when bullying occurs, other laws require the intervention of the juvenile justice system.527 Some legislatures included model bullying policies that schools could adopt in order to show compliance.528

517. See Negrón Letter, supra note 486, at 6–7.
518. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213 (2011); Dear Colleague Letter, supra
note 80, at 1–3.
519. STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at 15, 17.
520. NAT’L SCH. BDS. ASS’N, supra note 77. States whose legislation uses the words “bullying,” “cyber-bullying,” or “harassment” include, but are not limited to the following states:
Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Mississippi, Nevada, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas,
Washington, and West Virginia. Id.
521. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 80, at 2.
522. See STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at 17–18.
523. NAT’L SCH. BDS. ASS’N, supra note 77.
524. Id.
525. STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at i–ii.
526. See id. at 16.
527. Id. at 16, 19–20.
528. Id. at 19.
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According to the report’s executive summary, forty-six states have enacted bullying laws.529 Forty-three of these states direct schools to create
anti-bullying policies; yet three of these states fail to define the behavior that
constitutes bullying.530 Thirty-six states prohibit bullying via electronic media while thirteen of the forty-six states give schools the authority to discipline off-campus behavior if the behavior creates a hostile school environment.531
As state legislatures and school agencies as well as local school boards
grapple with cyberbullying, the First Amendment, and the Department of
Education’s Office for Civil Rights definition of “harassment,” there are
many publications offering model legislation that will allegedly satisfy everyone and every requirement.532 According to Stuart-Cassel and Dayton,
state legislatures should ensure that school bullying legislation incorporates
the following components:
• a statement of purpose that explains the reason for the legislation;533
• a statement of scope that defines the extent or reach of the legislation, i.e. to what behaviors is it applicable and to what behaviors is it not applicable;534
• definitions and examples of behaviors that constitute bullying,
cyberbullying, and harassment; these definitions should protect
students from the day to day realities of bullying yet not be so
overbroad that free speech rights are intruded upon;535
529. Id. at x. Hawaii, Montana, Michigan, and South Dakota were the only states that did
not have some form of bullying legislation in effect as of April 2011. STUART-CASSEL ET AL.,
supra note 52, at 17.
530. Id. at 25. Arizona, Minnesota and Wisconsin enacted anti-bullying legislation but did
not define the behavior that constitutes bullying. Id.
531. Id. at 15.
532. See Dayton et al., Model Anti-Bullying Legislation: Promoting Student Safety, Civility, and Achievement Through Law and Policy Reform, 272 EDUC. L. REP. 19, 24–32 (2011);
see also STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at 89–94. John Dayton, Anne Proffitt Dupre,
and Ann Elizabeth Blankenship discussed the creation of a model anti-bully statute that would
protect students and promote civility and safety in a recent article. See Dayton et al., supra
note 532, at 25–32.
533. STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at 22; see also Dayton et al., supra note 532, at
25.
534. STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at 23; see also Dayton et al., supra note 532, at
26.
535. STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at 24–25; see also Dayton et al., supra note
532, at 24, 26–27.
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• the development and creation of state wide school policies
that protect children’s rights to be free from bullying and to exercise their First Amendment rights; such policies can be shared by
school districts throughout the state;536
• a requirement that school personnel model appropriate behavior and enforce anti-bullying policies;537
• a requirement that schools publicize and communicate the existence of school anti-bullying policies;538
• a requirement that training be provided for school personnel to
model appropriate behavior and counsel students whose behavior
violates school policies;539
• a mandatory reporting requirement, requiring schools to report
violations of school policies;540
• a requirement that criminal acts be treated as criminal acts and
not as bullying;541 and
• a requirement that appropriate counseling and disciplinary
provisions be provided for students whose conduct violates school
bullying policies.542

While the above suggestions for model legislation and model school
policies regarding bullying are useful, they are still not sufficiently detailed
to answer the questions that courts and school districts continue to ask: Can
off-campus student cyberspeech be punished by schools?543 If so, under
what circumstances can off-campus speech be punished?544 Answering these
536. STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at 18–19, 22, 24–25, 28.
537. Id. at 33; Dayton et al., supra note 532, at 27–28.
538. STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at 32.
539. Dayton et al., supra note 532, at 30.
540. STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at 36–37; Dayton et al., supra note 532, at 28.
541. STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at 20; Dayton et al., supra note 532, at 30–31.
542. STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at 69–70; Dayton et al., supra note 532, at 30.
543. See, e.g., Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 798 (N.D. Ohio
2002) (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988); Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
544. Presently, there are two student speech cases being appealed from federal district
courts to federal circuit courts that involved the discipline of off-campus student cyberspeech.
Brief of Appellants, Bell, supra note 481, at 7 (appealing to the United States Court of Ap-

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol37/iss2/2

54

Smith-Butler: Walking the Regulatory Tightrope: Balancing Bullies' Free Speech

2013]

WALKING THE REGULATORY TIGHTROPE

297

questions addresses the intersection of students’ First Amendment rights, the
Department of Education’s enforcement of civil rights laws, and state antibullying legislation.545
V.

ANALYSIS

As Snyder so clearly stated: Speech, even painful and hurtful speech, is
revered and protected in America.546 Why? It is believed that selfgovernment, to a great degree, is determined by the free exchange of ideas
even if it does lead to an “uninhibited [and] robust” discussion.547 “‘[T]he
essence of self-government’” is believed to be the ability to speak out on
matters of public importance and to discuss unpopular viewpoints.548 The
suppression of speech counteracts this belief.549 So deeply ingrained in the
American psyche is the principle of free speech that America, as a society,
was willing to tolerate the free speech rights of Nazis to march through a

peals for the Fifth Circuit); Brief of Appellees, Wynar, supra note 481, at 7 (being appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit). In Bell v. Itawamba County School
Board, Taylor Bell wrote and published, via Facebook and YouTube, a rap song that was
critical of his coaches. 859 F. Supp. 2d 834, 836 (N.D. Miss. 2012). Taylor was suspended
for a week and then moved to an alternative school for the remainder of the semester because
his rap song was deemed by the school board to constitute both harassment of school employees and threats. Id.; Brief of Appellants, Bell, supra note 481, at 16. In Wynar v. Douglas
County School District, Wynar instant messaged a classmate, saying that he wanted to “shoot”
named classmates. No. 3:09-cv-0626-LRH-VPC, 2011 WL 3512534, at *1 (D. Nev. Aug. 10,
2011); Brief of Appellees, Wynar, supra note 481, at 12. These instant messages were forwarded to school administration. Wynar, 2011 WL 3512534, at *1; Brief of Appellees, Wynar, supra note 481, at 14–15. The school then suspended Wynar for ninety days. Wynar,
2011 WL 3512534, at *1; Brief of Appellees, Wynar, supra note 481, at 18. Also, there is a
pending case in the District Court of Minnesota that involves off-campus discipline of a student for cyberspeech. R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, No. 12-588,
2012 WL 3870868, at *1 (D. Minn. Sept. 6, 2012). In that case, R.S. complained about a hall
monitor and communicated about sex with a classmate via Facebook. Id. at *1–2. The classmate’s guardian complained to the school principal. Id. at *2. To determine the accuracy of
these statements, R.S. was detained and her Facebook account was searched by school officials. Id.
545. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007); Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681–83; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
546. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011).
547. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (citing Terminiello v. Chicago,
337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937)).
548. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215 (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75
(1964)).
549. See id. at 1219 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988)).
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village of Holocaust Jewish survivors in Skokie, Illinois.550 Given the priority that is placed on speech in American life, do K–12 students and their
teachers have free speech rights in school where they are learning to participate in the “‘marketplace of ideas?’”551
In 1969, the Supreme Court made it plain in Tinker that students and
teachers did not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”552 After Tinker, some would argue that
later Supreme Court decisions on the topic made it less clear to what extent
student speech rights existed and when schools could suppress or punish
student speech. Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse all indicated that while protection of student speech rights was important, it was not absolute.553 In Fraser, Justice Burger wrote that “simply because the use of an offensive form
of expression may not be prohibited to adults making what the speaker considers a political point, [does not mean that] the same latitude must be permitted to children in a public school.”554 It became obvious between 1986
when Fraser was decided, and later in 2007 when Chief Justice Roberts authored the majority opinion in Morse, that confusion within the courts as to
the correct analysis regarding student speech still existed.555 Justice Roberts
sought to clarify by writing:
[I]t is enough to distill from Fraser two basic principles. First,
Fraser’s holding demonstrates that “the constitutional rights of
students in public school are not automatically coextensive with
the rights of adults in other settings.” Had Fraser delivered the
same speech in a public forum outside the school context, it would
have been protected. In school, however, Fraser’s First Amend550. See Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Nadine Strossen and Freedom of Expression: A Dialogue with the ACLU’s Top Card-Carrying Member, 13 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J.
185, 203 (2003). The article indicates that the ACLU’s defense of the Nazis to march through
Skokie, Illinois, a town then heavily populated with Jewish survivors of the Holocaust, reflected the fact that while many theoretically agreed with free speech, the ACLU still lost 15%
of its membership for defending the free speech rights of Nazis in Skokie in 1978. Id. at 203
& n.79. According to the article, Strossen concluded that while the principle of free speech
was firmly entrenched within the United States legal system, it was also poorly understood.
Id. at 203.
551. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (quoting
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
552. Id. at 503, 506.
553. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396–97, 410 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266, 273, 276 (1988) (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506, 509, 512–13);
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
554. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677, 682.
555. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 396, 409–10; Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 264–66, 276; Fraser,
478 U.S. at 679–80, 685–86.
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ment rights were circumscribed “in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.” Second, Fraser established that
the mode of analysis set forth in Tinker is not absolute. Whatever
approach Fraser employed, it certainly did not conduct the “substantial disruption” analysis prescribed by Tinker.556

With four Supreme Court opinions on K–12 student speech from 1969
through 2007, it would seem that the issue was settled.557 The analysis
should have been clear for lower courts to apply to the facts of cases before
them. However, the lower courts have applied the Tinker analysis to cases
that involved similar facts; yet these courts have reached dissimilar conclusions.558
In Doninger II, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reiterated the problems facing lower courts.559 In addition to the confusion surrounding the application of the Morse quartet analysis to student
speech cases, courts and schools are now grappling with the implications of
off-campus cyberspeech that ends up on-campus and is often described by
schools as “cyberbullying.”560 Doninger II eloquently captured the dilemma
of lower courts, saying “[t]he law governing restrictions on student speech
can be difficult and confusing, even for lawyers, law professors, and judges.
The relevant Supreme Court cases can be hard to reconcile, and courts often
struggle to determine which standard applies in any particular case.”561
Judges are not alone in their confusion.562 As Naomi Harlin Goodno states in
an article that she authored: “There is no Supreme Court case squarely on
point. The split in the lower courts’ decisions shows that the law is ambiguous.”563
What is a principal to do? He or she is “damned if they do and damned
if they don’t” act when confronted with off-campus cyberspeech that makes

556. Morse, 551 U.S. at 396, 404–05 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
557. See id. at 410; Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273, 276; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 686–87; Tinker,
393 U.S. at 514.
558. Compare Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 783–84, 790
(E.D. Mich. 2002), with J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 869 (Pa.
2002).
559. See Doninger II, 642 F.3d 334, 353 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011).
560. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 850–52; see also Evans v. Bayer, 604 F. Supp.
2d 1365, 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
561. See Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 353 (citing Morse, 551 U.S. at 430).
562. E.g., Naomi Harlin Goodno, How Public Schools Can Constitutionally Halt Cyberbullying: A Model Cyberbullying Policy That Considers First Amendment, Due Process, and
Fourth Amendment Challenges, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 641, 657 (2011).
563. Id. (footnote omitted).
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its way on-campus and involves either bullying or harassment. Principals,
school boards, and school districts face numerous questions, including:
• Whether schools can regulate off-campus student speech that is
online, i.e., cyberspeech, if it is directed at either school personnel or students, and then arrives on-campus?564 If so, under what circumstances can
this speech be regulated?565
• Whether geography, i.e., on-campus or off-campus, can be the litmus
test for regulation of this speech?566
• Whether a substantial disruption is established by the arrival, in any
form, of off-campus speech on the school’s campus?567 If not, is chaos required to meet the substantial disruption test? What constitutes a substantial
disruption?
• Whether the individual student’s free speech right that collides with
another student’s right to be let alone will prevail? What about a student’s
right to be free from bullying and harassment?568
Unfortunately, there appear to be more questions than answers, which is why
many are urging the Supreme Court of the United States to grant certiorari
and resolve the issue.569
The issues facing the courts, the schools, the state legislatures, the students, and the Department of Education can be summarized as: Can a school
regulate student speech or expression that occurs outside of school and is not
connected to a school sponsored event, yet subsequently makes its way oncampus by either the speaker or others? If so, under what circumstances can
the speech be regulated? If such speech is beyond the school’s ability to
regulate, can schools escape the imposition of liability by the Department of
Education and state laws for failure to respond to harassment or bullying?570

564. See Thomas Wheeler, Facebook Fatalities: Students, Social Networking, and the
First Amendment, 31 PACE L. REV. 182, 214 (2011).
565. See id. at 199–200.
566. Morse, 551 U.S. at 405; see Wheeler, supra note 564, at 214–15.
567. See Wheeler, supra note 564, at 199–200.
568. See id. at 217.
569. See id. at 185.
570. See id. at 183–85.
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If it is possible to evade liability, how do schools, parents, and society want
to handle the bullying that sometimes leads to suicide?571
A thorough review of Tinker reveals that the Court began its discussion
by acknowledging that earlier court decisions affirmed “the comprehensive
authority of the [s]tates and of school officials, consistent with fundamental
constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the school[].
Our problem lies in the area where students in the exercise of First Amendment rights collide with the rules of the school authorities.”572 The language
of Tinker indicates that the Court considered student speech to have First
Amendment protection regardless of whether it took place inside or outside
of the classroom.573 The Court said:
A student’s rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom
hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on
the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if
he does so without “materially and substantially interfer[ing] with
the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school” and without colliding with the rights of others. But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason—
whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior—materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of
the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.574

The Court cites to the earlier decisions of Burnside v. Byars575 and Blackwell
v. Issaquena County Board of Education,576 to support the above conclusion.577
A literal reading of Tinker reflects that schools can regulate or discipline student speech that occurs off-campus if it has an on-campus impact
that either causes a substantial disruption with the school’s work, is reasonably foreseeable that it will cause a substantial disruption with the school’s

571. See, e.g., id. at 183–84, 227; see also BULLY, http://www.thebullyproject.
com/movement/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2013) (providing information about the film, Bully,
produced by The Bully Project).
572. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (citations
omitted).
573. Id. at 512–13.
574. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
575. 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
576. 363 F.2d 749, 753 (5th Cir. 1966).
577. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13.
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work, or it collides with the rights of others.578 While some lower courts
have debated whether a school’s authority even extends to off-campus student speech in any format, Tinker does not appear to contemplate that.579
From my perspective, Tinker is applicable to off-campus speech, including
cyberspeech, that arrives on-campus and either creates a substantial disruption or collides with the rights of others.580 Given the technological advances
of the last twenty years, a geographical litmus test as to when student speech
can be disciplined by schools is too limited.581
While courts have discussed and analyzed both the “substantial disruption” and the “reasonably foreseeable substantial disruption” Tinker tests,
courts have paid little attention to Tinker’s third prong, the “collides with the
rights of others” test.582 Perhaps this third prong, in conjunction with the
“substantial disruption” test could be developed and used to analyze student
speech cases that do not fit the parameters of Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and
Morse.583 Utilization of the “collides with the rights of others” test might
resolve some of the behaviors that so bedevil and trouble school administrators.584 How? This prong could be used to discipline student speech that
does not substantially disrupt the school’s work but that can be described as
bullying, harassing, libelous, or threatening. Speech described as bullying,
harassing, libelous, or threatening, if it is directed at other students or school
personnel, is not protected speech and can be disciplined even if it does not
create a “substantial disruption.”585 Why should this approach be allowed?
The school’s goal is to teach students civil discourse and debate while pro-

578. See id. at 514.
579. See id. at 507–08; see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007). The Court
in Morse explained that “[h]ad Fraser delivered the same speech in a public forum outside the
school context, it would have been protected.” Morse, 551 U.S. at 405. This statement adds
further confusion to the analysis, as some lower courts have concluded that Fraser meant lewd
speech, if off-campus, could not be regulated under any circumstances. See Layshock III, 650
F.3d 205, 219 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S.
ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
580. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13.
581. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder I, No. 3:07cv585, 2008 WL 4279517, at *9 n.5 (M.D. Pa. Sept.
11, 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en banc, 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132
S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
582. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513–14; see e.g., Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th
Cir. 1966).
583. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513–14; see also Morse, 551 U.S. at 403; Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270–73 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675, 677–80 (1986).
584. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513–14.
585. See id.
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tecting their rights to debate contentious issues.586 Yet the schools must also
provide a safe environment in which students can thrive and learn without
being subjected to harassment, bullying, libel, or threats. Schools want to
protect student political speech rights yet also allow schools the flexibility to
cope with the cruelty, racism, sexism, libel, or threats that other types of student speech create.587
With the above approach, the analysis of student school speech, whether
on or off-campus, then becomes the following:
• Is the speech lewd, involving a captive audience, and used on campus?588 If so, apply Fraser.
• If not, is it speech that carries the imprimatur of the school and involves pedagogy?589 If so, apply Kuhlmeier.
• If not, is the speech off-campus speech at a school sponsored event
that appears to promote illegal drug use?590 If so, apply Morse.
• If neither Fraser, Kuhlmeier, or Morse is applicable, apply Tinker’s
“substantial disruption” test. Did the speech arrive on-campus and disrupt
school classes or administration?591 If so, the speech can be disciplined.592
An exception to the “substantial disruption” test might mean that pure political speech can be protected even if it does cause a “substantial disruption.”
What is a substantial disruption? Courts are still debating this.593 In Doninger II, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found a
“substantial disruption” occurred when the school administration was forced
to have numerous meetings and handle many irate parental emails and phone
calls because of Avery Donginer’s blog post.594 Yet the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Layshock III, held that the student discussion and administrative uproar caused by Jason Layshock’s parody posting
586. See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 80, at 1–2.
587. See id. at 2.
588. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Pico ex rel. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
859 (1982); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968).
589. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
590. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007).
591. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
592. Id. at 513.
593. See Layshock III, 650 F.3d 205, 218–19 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied sub
nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Doninger II, 642
F.3d 334, 347 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011).
594. See Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 341, 351.
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about the school’s principal did not constitute a substantial and material disruption.595 If the Supreme Court would define substantial disruption, it
would greatly assist the analysis of student speech cases. The definition
should not be too restrictive, i.e. one person’s bad day should not constitute a
substantial disruption, yet neither chaos nor turmoil should be required to
establish substantial disruption. A description or list of behaviors that demonstrate substantial disruption would help resolve the issue. From my perspective, student speech that requires school personnel to spend 75% of their
week dealing with the problems generated by the speech could be considered
a substantial disruption. School personnel responding to telephone calls,
emails, student and parent visits, counseling sessions, disciplinary sessions,
hearings, and classroom time are examples of substantial disruption.
• If the speech does not cause a substantial disruption, it could be regulated under Tinker’s third prong—the “collides with the rights of others”
test—if the speech is directed at other students or school personnel and can
be described as speech that is bullying, harassing, libelous or threatening.596
The above analysis would balance competing rights, allowing schools to
operate without chaos and disruption while preserving the political speech of
students and providing a safe school environment that neither permits, condones, or ignores student bullying or harassment.
How should courts then handle Tinker’s “reasonably foreseeable disruption” test? While the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that it was reasonably foreseeable that a violent instant message icon in
Wisniewski would cause a substantial disruption,597 district courts in Indiana
and California concluded that raunchy student photos and bullying YouTube
videos did not substantially disrupt nor was it foreseeable that the student
behavior involved would disrupt school operations.598 Perhaps the “reasonably foreseeable” test could be retired. If the “substantial disruption” and
“collides with the rights of others” tests are used, the “reasonably foreseeable” test becomes irrelevant.599 Avery Doninger’s blast email and blog created a substantial disruption, because parents and students behaved as she
595. See Layshock III, 650 F.3d at 207–09, 219.
596. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508–09, 513 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749
(5th Cir. 1966)).
597. See Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38–39 (2d Cir. 2007).
598. T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 784 (N.D.
Ind. 2011); J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1107–
08, 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
599. J.C. ex rel R.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1122.
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requested, contacting the school and bombarding the school with messages
on the topic of Jamfest.600 School personnel spent days dealing with phone
calls, emails, and parental concerns that resulted from the Jamfest post.601
Too much staff time was wasted on an issue that can be judged to be relatively unimportant.602 The “substantial disruption” test is necessary because
Doninger’s speech did not fit in the category of a threat or libel nor did it
constitute harassment or bullying which would be necessary to apply in a
“collides with the rights of others” test.603
Using the “collides with the rights of others” test means the court’s
holding in Wisniewski is correct, as it involved a true threat which would
permit Wisniewski’s speech to be disciplined.604 T.V.’s holding is also then
correct under this analysis.605 In T.V. ex rel B.V., the raunchy pictures did not
involve harassment, bullying, libel, or threats.606 They also did not create a
substantial disruption at school as only two or three parents complained to
the school.607 This is not speech with which the school should be involved.608
This speech, while raunchy, should be protected.609 Parents who objected to
it should interact directly with T.V.’s parents rather than requesting that the
school act as the intermediary. In T.V. ex rel B.V., there is not a sufficient
nexus between the student’s speech, the aggrieved students and parents, and
the school.610 This speech involved off-campus behavior that should have
been handled by and among parents rather than involving the school. Thus,
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana reached

600. Doninger I, 527 F.3d 41, 44–45, 49–50 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Wisniewski, 494 F.3d
at 40), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011).
601. See id. at 44–45.
602. See id. at 46.
603. See id. at 53; see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
513 (1969).
604. See Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d at 37–38 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513).
While some of the courts discussed “real” threats as opposed to “perceived” threats, this distinction is not helpful. Given the ability of individuals to heavily arm themselves and then
massacre those with whom they disagree, it seems unfair to place school administrators in the
position of trying to sort through what constitutes a real threat as opposed to a joke.
605. See T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 784
(N.D. Ind. 2011).
606. See id. at 771, 775.
607. Id. at 784.
608. See id. at 783–84.
609. Id. at 776.
610. T.V. ex rel B.V., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 783.
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the correct decision in T.V. ex rel B.V., as did the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Wisniewski.611
Yet while the United States District Court for the Central District of
California applied the correct analysis to the facts in J.C. ex rel. R.C., it
reached the wrong conclusion.612 J.C.’s behavior toward C.C. constituted
harassment, bullying, and possibly libel. Had the court used the “collides
with the rights of others” test rather than the “substantial disruption” test, it
would have been easy for the school to discipline J.C. without worrying
about whether J.C.’s behavior resulted in a substantial disruption of work at
school.
Using the above analysis, i.e., the student’s speech either creates a substantial disruption at school or collides with the rights of others, I would argue that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reached
the correct decision in Kowalski I, using the wrong analysis. Kara Kowalski
used the internet to mock, taunt, bully, and harass a fellow classmate, Shay
N.613 While Kara’s off-campus speech may not have created a substantial
disruption in terms of additional work created for school administrators, it
was conduct that could certainly be described as bullying or harassing another classmate.614 Again using the above analysis, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in its en banc opinions in Layshock III615
and Snyder III,616 reached incorrect decisions and used the wrong analysis.
Since both of those decisions involved off-campus student cyberspeech that
could be described as libelous or harassing of school personnel, one could
conclude, using the “collides with the rights of others” test, that Tinker was
satisfied and that both Layshock and Snyder could be disciplined for their
speech.617
As Tinker is now being construed, it is difficult for courts to apply the
appropriate analysis to the particular facts of a case before them.618 Melinda

611. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2007); T.V. ex rel B.V., 807 F.
Supp. 2d at 784.
612. See J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1117–
18, 1122 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
613. See Kowalski I, 652 F.3d 565, 567–69 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1095
(2012).
614. See id. at 572.
615. Layshock III, 650 F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Blue
Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
616. J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d 915, 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132
S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
617. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 930; Layshock III, 650 F.3d at 219.
618. See discussion supra Part II.C–D.
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Cupps Dickler’s excellent article suggests that despite the confusion of the
student speech cases that the justices agree on the following principles:
• “[S]tudents retain significant First Amendment protection [while] in
school;”619
• However, students’ rights are limited and are not as extensive as
those of adults;620
• “[S]chool officials [are] permitted substantial discretion to maintain
discipline, even” if that results—not intentionally, but as a consequence—in
the restriction of speech;621
• “[P]olitical . . . speech is strongly protected . . . from viewpoint discrimination;”622
• “Tinker’s ‘substantial disruption’ test [is still] applicable to any student speech that [is] not . . . regulated . . . by Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and
Morse.”623
VI. CONCLUSION
Schools, state legislatures, courts, students, parents, and the Department
of Education continue to grapple with balancing the speech rights of students
with the rights of students to be “‘let alone.’”624 Since the Supreme Court
denied certiorari in three cases this past term, it seems clear that they consider the matter settled.625 However, a reading of decisions from the various
district and circuit courts in the last decade indicates confusion still exists.626
Lower courts are applying, misapplying, or misunderstanding the holdings
from the Court’s decisions in this area.627 Different results, often with similar factual situations, continue.628 A citation analysis of Kowalski, indicates
619.
620.
621.
622.
623.
624.
625.
626.
627.
628.
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See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
McCarthy, supra note 45, at 19–20; see also discussion supra Part II.C–D.
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that cases in the secondary student cyberspeech arena continue through the
court’s pipelines.629 Given the importance of bully prevention, the liability
issues involved, and the confusion surrounding what is deemed to be the
appropriate reaction of school officials to off-campus student cyberspeech
that comes on campus, it would be very helpful if the Court addressed this
subject and provided a clear analysis soon.

629. See, e.g., R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, No. 12-588, 2012
WL 3870868, at *1 (D. Minn. Sept. 6, 2012); Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 859 F. Supp.
2d 834, 836 (N.D. Miss. 2012); Wynar v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 3:09-cv-0626-LRHVPC, 2011 WL 3512534, at *1 (D. Nev. Aug. 10, 2011).
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